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NO TIME FOR TRUMPETS: TITLE VII, EQUALITY,
AND THE FIN DE SIECLE
D. Marvin Jones*
FoREwoRD
I grew up in the East Baltimore of the 1950s. My father was a
steelworker at Bethlehem Steel. Bag lunch in hand, he would leave
our row house late at night on his way to the Sparrow's Point Plant.
He worked from eleven to seven - when he could get work -
loading trains with iron ore.
My mother "did hair." She worked in the cramped confines of
our kitchen, straightening and styling, curlers rattling, two hours per
customer, for a fee of two dollars and twenty-five cents each.
She was very industrious.
My grandparents on both sides were farmers in rural Virginia.
My great-great grandparents were slaves.
We were called "Negroes" then, and as Negroes we lived behind
a kind of wall - not a physical wall, but a wall of deeply under-
stood limitations on what we could aspire to, what work we could
get, what constituted achievement. The wall ran high and long
across the vale of history and surrounded not only my family but
my totally Negro neighborhood as well. The wall, as a pattern of
economic and social relations, replicated itself across the United
States of my youth. The meaning of being a Negro in the 1950s, an
era in which Jim Crow and overt segregation held sway, was that
one had to live behind the wall. Behind the wall my mother and
father, my cousins and uncles, worked as janitors and stevedores
and maids and hairdressers and garbage men and steelworkers. We
picked the cotton, washed the floors, cooked food in restaurants in
which we could not be served, made the beds, cut the grass, and
sold watermelon from horse-driven carts.
The psychological reality of the time is perhaps best chronicled
by the popular culture it produced. I remember shows like Tarzan,
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Jack Benny, and Amos "n' Andy portraying the Negro variously as a
native, as a childlike butler, or as a con man long on ambition but
short on talent, trying to bilk his friends. These depictions of Ne-
groes of the 1950s, in the explicit way in which they walled Negroes
out of any sense of human dignity, mirrored perfectly the explicit
way we Negroes were walled out of the larger economy and society
in those bad old days. From behind the wall I would call my par-
ents to the living room whenever a miracle would happen, as they
did from time to time - when a Negro would be shown, not as a
native with a spear or a con man or a servant, but in a respectable
job, perhaps as a high school teacher. These respectable jobs did
exist for Negroes, but they were in Negro schools or hospitals. We
could be respectable, after a fashion, but we had to stay behind the
wall.
The wall in effect divided true respectability and its imitation.
Respectability always had a white face. The principals of the
schools I went to - all of which were predominantly Negro -
were white; the policemen were white; the mayor and the lawyers
and the executives I saw downtown were white. Whites ran the
banks and did the hiring at the restaurants, at Bethlehem Steel, at
the taxi cab company, at City Hall. Whites presided over the
courts; they were the foremen at the plant. The boss was white; the
insurance man was white.
The world of the 1950s, along with the stark and demeaning pat-
terns of de jure segregation in employment, has passed away. Since
then, I have struggled to wrest my identity from the clutches of
Tarzan and of Amos and Andy. I am now a professor of law at a
southern law school. I have moved from the inner city of East Bal-
timore to the suburbs of Miami amidst palm trees, Olympic-size
pools, and glitzy sports cars - and I am no longer called a Negro.
My friends include blacks who are lawyers, doctors, members of
legislatures, and members of university faculty. One legacy of the
past is progress, at least for the talented tenth. But somehow I do
not think this is yet a time for trumpets.
Ironically, the people I see who cut the lawn, who pick up the
trash, who wield jackhammers to fix up the streets, are still almost
always black. The law firms, the doctors' offices, the hospitals, the
judges' chambers, the faculty lounges at most major law schools, the
corporate boardrooms, the U.S. Senate, and the affluent areas of
town are still overwhelmingly white. For me the worlds of the
1950s and of the 1990s are not distinct but seem to interpenetrate
one another. The wall is less visible. But the wall is still there.
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INTRODUCTION
And they said unto him: We have dreamed a dream and there is no
interpreter of it.1
Equality is the precept in whose name America has chartered
itself. Since Jefferson's famous aphorism, "We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," 2 the idea
of equality has rung down the corridors of history as a clarion call
to national unity and resolve. In the midst of the Civil War, Lincoln
invoked equality as an exhortation to a renewed sense of national
identity in his Gettysburg Address: "[O]ur fathers brought forth
upon this continent a new nation.., dedicated to the proposition
that all men are created equal."' 3 In the twentieth century in the
speech of former President Lyndon Johnson, equality reverberated
as a summons to rededication to national ideals: "This was the first
nation in the history of the world to be founded with a purpose.
The great phrases of that purpose still sound in every American
Heart . . . 'All men are created equal' ..... 4 In the legitimating
myth5 reposing in the Declaration of Independence and in'the nar-
ratives of three presidents, equality has been the moral equivalent
of the holy grail: it is the object of our sacred quest, and this quest
has defined and ennobled us. Equality and our professed search for
1. Genesis 40:8.
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 2 CARL SANDBURG,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 469 (1939). Notice that the rhetoric of Lincoln draws
on a metaphor of birth. It is the ideal of equality that gives this metaphor its particular
eloquence because our notion of equality and the story of the nation's birth that Lincoln
retells are references to and for each other.
4. Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, 1 PUB. PAPERS 281, 282
(Mar. 15, 1965).
5. I use myth here in two senses: first, as a story or narrative that helps explain the world,
and second, as a fairy tale or fantasy that covers up the world's profane aspects, as the story
of the stork's bringing babies does. In the first sense, I refer to the narrative about equality
that occurs as a theme in the story of how this nation was founded and how American society
came to have its formal emphasis on "equal justice under law." See Robert Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword. Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,4 (1983)
("No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning."). This narrative is a "legitimating myth" in that it allows Americans to
think of themselves as both democratic and morally whole. As Cover suggests, these stories
act as narratives to connect American institutions to the normative world, or nomos.
These stories about egalitarian traditions are myths in the fairy-tale sense to the extent
that institutions like chattel slavery and segregation profoundly contradict them. In this
sense the equality story operates as a kind of psychic detour on the bridge between nomos
and historical American institutions to connect Americans to a wishful, fictive reality. The
equality narratives are signs by which Americans have created a false national identity - a
fictive self - to mediate between themselves and the normative world they have created.
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it in each era renews that era as a time of beginning, a time shot
through with an emancipatory, revolutionary spirit 6 Equality has
given us both our sense of who we are and our sense of the spirit of
the age.
But prior to 1964, equality for black7 Americans was only a
dream. This was particularly true in the realm of employment.8 It
6. In this point, in speaking of equality as a theme in an American historical narrative,
two things are implicit. The first is the nature of the epistemic framework that informs legal
texts, whether Title VII, which is the subject here, or any other legal text, and takes its mean-
ing from the historical narratives "that locate it and give it meaning." See id. at 4-5. The
second point is Walter Benjamin's and explains historical narrative as a trope or figure in
which a revolutionary time, or a time when the nation overcame a crisis, is paired with, or
rhetorically mirrored in, the present:
[N]o fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It becomes historical posthu-
mously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years.
A historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events
like the beads of a rosary. Instead he grasps the constellation which his own era has
formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a conception of the present as the
"time of the now" which is shot through with chips of Messianic time.
WALTER BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS 253, 263
(Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry Zohn trans., Schocken Books 1969) (1955).
7. In this essay I speak, using the black experience with discrimination as a reference
point. This reflects my desire in this essay, and in my work generally, to find an authentic
voice - to find my voice. I must add that I reject the notion that there is an objective or
neutral place to stand in legal, historical, or philosophical inquiry, I am reminded of the
black woman who asked her white female colleague what she saw when she looked in the
mirror. "I see a woman," the colleague said. She asked a white male colleague, and he said,
"I see a human being." But the black woman said she saw a "black woman" when she looked
in the mirror. Our identities and experiences situate us - and our scholarship. Tradition-
ally, of course, some experiences and identities, white male identity for example, have been
more privileged than others. At the same time a pervasive claim of universalism and per-
spectivelessness within our academic culture obscures race and gender as operative catego-
ries. In this privileging process, the very mechanism of hierarchy becomes invisible, In
speaking openly from his own experience, the scholar of color hopes to make visible what
"perspectiveless" discussions obscure. Also, my effort to seek the rich particularity of my
own experience is not exclusive of exploring the "experience" of the marginalized other in
general. Latinos, gays, and women, to varying degrees, will find the black experience a para-
digm for understanding their own.
8. It was a dream first in the obvious sense of an imaginary, utopian, and humanizing
vision that offered psychological release from a dehumanizing social reality. Equality was a
dream also in the sense of a vision incapable of being expressed within the formalism of
ordinary language. This "transcendental" notion of equality resonates in black literature and
oratory. King expressed this notion of equality by referring to it as "his dream":
I ... have a dream.., that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning
of its creed - we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. I
have a dream that one day... sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners will
be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.... I have a dream that one day
every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low.., and all flesh
shall see it together.... This will be the day when all of God's children will be able to
sing . . . "Free at last, free at last; thank God Almighty, we are free at last."
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HoPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217,219-220 (James M. Washington ed.,
1986). Another poet talked of it as something not of "earth":
That bright chimeric beast
Conceived yet never born,
Save in the poet's breast,
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was a dream word that reposed deep in the realm of the moral im-
agination, inspiring itinerant preachers, civil rights marchers, presi-
dents at moments of national crisis, and progressive whites, but yet
only a word - one whose truth had never been realized within the
lived experience of black Americans. But dreams still have the
power of prophecy. Words still have power to create worlds.9 It
was this mere dream that had the power to unite a coalition of
blacks and northern liberals into a social and political movement
beginning after the end of the Second World War.10
The movement was extraparliamentary in form and consisted of
protest marches, sit-ins, freedom rides, freedom walks, and eco-
nomic boycotts." As an extraparliamentary expression, the move-
Never may be taken
In any earthly wood.
That bird forever feathered,
Of its new self the sire,
After aeons weathered,
Reincarnate by fire,
If beasts like these you'd harry,
Plumb then the poet's dream;
Make it your wood and stream.
Countee Cullen, That Bright Chimeric Beast, in AMERICAN NEGRO POETRY 86, 86-87 (Arna
Bontemps ed., rev. ed. 1974).
9. "[I]n the creation myth of the Hebrews, God made the world by word of mouth; and in
the Christian myth as recorded in St. John's Gospel the Word became God himself." Chinua
Achebe, Language and the Destiny of Man, in HoPEs AND IMPEDIMENTS, SELECTED ESSAYS
1965-1987, at 87, 88-89 (1988). The stories of origin may be read as ancient, mythic represen-
tations of the spiritual source of life or as a symbolic expression of modern-postmodern in-
sights as to the role of language in our inner life. In the same vein, Edward Sapir writes:
Language is not merely a... systematic inventory of the various items of experience...
but is also a self-contained, creative symbolic organization, which not only refers to ex-
perience... but actually defines experience for us by reason of its formal completeness
and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of
experience.
Edward Sapir, Conceptual Categories In Primitive Languages, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE
AND SOClEY 128, 128 (Dell Hymes ed., 1964).
10. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 181 (1979). Piven and Cloward identify a coalition of
blacks, white industrial workers, and the Democratic party. The great northern migration
saw vast numbers of blacks move north. At the same time the Democratic party's southern
base was eroding. Thus, Democratic presidents came to rely upon the black vote. Also,
urban blacks shared class interests with whites on jobs and labor issues in the party of the
New Deal. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 74-177 (1990) (detailing the
political history of, inter alia, Title VII, and describing a coalition centered around liberal
Democrats, labor organizations, and blacks).
11. The simultaneously glorious, tragic, heroic, and disappointing civil rights era is won-
derfully conjured up by the speeches and documents that survive. See THE EYES ON THE
PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM
THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 1954-1990 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1987). See gener-
ally GRAHAM, supra note 10 (providing a sense of the major actors and wars of maneuver at
the level of presidential politics).
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ment confronted American politics as the cogito confronts the self:
the marchers and sit-in protesters stood outside regular political
processes, outside the legality of the era of segregation, accepting
arrests and officially sanctioned brutality. This was in order to com-
pel Americans to stand in their consciences outside the political
process to see themselves and the sheer violence of segregation.
This operated at a discursive level: it deployed the story of origins,
told by Jefferson, Lincoln, and Johnson in tandem, with a utopian
vision of America as it could be - an America risen from the dark-
ness of the past. Equality was the suspension bridge between the
golden era of revolution and a hoped-for, progressive future, to
whose reality the marches were witness. It premised the reality of
segregation as an obstacle on the suspension bridge between
America and its destiny, between America and the spirit of its
ideals. Through this process of using equality as a conceptual
bridge to reimagination of national identity, the moral universe it-
self could be reconfigured. Racism in public life, formerly as quo-
tidian and as American as apple pie, became the "American
dilemma.' 2 This American dilemma became both social diagnosis
and anthem of a new America trying to be born. The new America
resonated with the impulse of the Enlightenment to celebrate indi-
viduality over race - modernity itself over the primitivism of the
segregated past.
Arrayed against the forces of change through the civil rights
movement was the structure of law and the interlocking institutions
that maintained segregation. Moreover, behind that structure,
deeper and stronger than segregationist laws, stood an ideological 13
structure of assumptions about the naturalness of excluding blacks.
Against notions of equality as a legitimating ideal was posed the
freedom of the individual to associate and the freedom of the prop-
erty owner to use his property, and particularly his workplace, as he
12. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (20th anniv. ed. 1962).
13. By ideology I refer to rationalizations within legal doctrine for oppressive power rela-
tionships defined and maintained by law. Ideology thus involves a masking or obfuscating of
the nonneutrality of legal institutions. See, e.g., Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the
Criminal Law, in DOUGLAS HAY ET AL, ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17,26 & n.2 (1975). A key
distinction must be made between characterizing the intent model as ideological and charac-
terizing it as a kind of dishonesty. As Clifford Geertz points out,
[Ideology] is not (quite) the same as lying ... for "whereas the liar tries to falsify the
thought of others while his own private thought is correct ... a person who falls for an
ideology is himself deluded in his private thought, and if he misleads others, does so
unwillingly and unwittingly."
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
193, 196 (1973) (quoting WERNER STARK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 48 n.2 (1958)).
2316 [Vol. 92:2311
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chose. Against the claims of modernity was posed the serenity and
order of the past with its bright lines demarcating the boundaries of
public and private. Questions of the employer's decisions fit
squarely in the private sphere.14 Within these social precincts of
American life, the segregation of blacks in employment was natu-
ral, or at least inevitable.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196415 represents the polit-
ical resolution of a historic conflict. Through Title VII, passed after
perhaps the longest legislative debate in history,16 the dream be-
came law. Through Title VII the word equality had become in a
sense flesh, or at least official policy. This new federal policy her-
alded and served as an emblem of a new era, perhaps a second Re-
construction, in American law.
There was consensus that the wall of segregation must come
down, that discrimination was illegal and had no place in the mar-
ketplace. The trouble was that the statute defined neither discrimi-
nation nor its animating ideal, equality. While equality or equal
opportunity had gone from gossamer ideal to concrete rule of law,
the nature and scope of this equality "rule" remained cloaked be-
hind the veil of indeterminacy.
In the early days we spoke of two models or theories of discrimi-
nation. There was, of course, the intent model. Under this concep-
tion the law prohibited discrimination as an intentional act. But it
was also possible to speak of discrimination as an effect or objective
result. Each of these theories of discrimination manifested a differ-
ent vision of the meaning of the phrase to be equal. Underlying
these diverging legal theories were diverging social visions. One vi-
sion involved "equality of opportunity" only, another "equality of
result." There was room within this framework to speak of discrim-
14. Essentially, the common law regarded relations between employer and employee,
master and servant, as a matter solely between the parties themselves. See Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of
Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RE-
SEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3,8-17 (1980) (describing the central tendency of the classi-
cal common law approach as an ordering of the social world into spheres of total liberty for
individual legal actors). But see Karl E. Klare, The PublicdPrivate Distinction in Labor Law,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1362-75 (1982) (tracing the common law public-private distinction
to a notion of property ownership).
15. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241,253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1988).
16. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTs 1020 (1970); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 230 (1985). Both texts offer a histori-
cal treatment of the passage of Title VII.
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ination as a violation of law and as a social problem, as a negative
prohibition and as an affirmative right. This was an initially open-
ended discourse in which contradictory and normatively divergent
conceptions of equality could both be discussed. 17
In my view, the significance of the past thirty years, from the
inauguration of Title VII to the present, is that the wheel has come
full circle. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in its enact-
ment, was indeed a symbol of national triumph over the racial past,
a monument to a nation's reaching the mountain top of its ideals.
But it has become scarcely more than a relic of our political history,
a memorial to consensus on moral aspiration. Title VII is the juridi-
cal equivalent of the last fading smile of a Cheshire cat of social
justice that has long since disappeared. The coalition of blacks and
northern liberals who were able to enact Title VII and who agreed
at the level of ideals on a need to end discrimination could not
.agree on the proper limits of the antidiscrimination principle.
Whites, North and South, increasingly distanced themselves from
the sacrifice and loss of privilege that giving full expression to the
liberal notion of equality would have meant 18 and opted for the
more conservative view. The collapse of the political coalition was
mirrored in our legal discourse.
The open-ended framework in which there was room for two
visions of equality, in which discourse was possible about the his-
tory and lived experience of blacks, has collapsed as well. In its
place the Supreme Court has erected a new framework that offers
only one coherent vision of equality. The Court gives equality fixed
boundaries, a new fixed sphere of expression.
In a real sense the Supreme Court has erected a new wall, a new
discursive barrier that places the bulk of what blacks experience as
racial subordination beyond the reach of discourse. In the end it
has rendered the discourse of equality meaningless for blacks.
My essay seeks to examine the internal architecture of the dis-
cursive barrier - the wall - that the Supreme Court has built
within the doctrinal framework of Title VII and concomitantly
within the discourse of equality. To understand how the Court has
17. See D. Marvin Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an
Elegy for Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1990) (arguing that the two theories reflected
opposing poles of thought involving the nature of legal rights - embracing both positivistic
and morality-based conceptions).
18. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 6 (1987) (suggesting that whites took on the cause of civil rights laws as a means of
redemption but retreated when they found that the laws in themselves did not bring redemp-
tion and that real sacrifice was required).
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erected this discursive wall, we must begin with history. Equality,
while historically a vehicle for national identity and contemporane-
ously for modernist conceptions of justice, is synchronically and
diachronically indeterminate. Equality is a deeply sedimented con-
cept' 9 with not one objective meaning but successive levels of
meaning built up over time. Each of those historic understandings
is itself a unity of opposites, of often contradictory interpretations
constructed by interpretive communities in conflict - former
slaves and former slave owners, northern Republicans and southern
Democrats, employers and minorities who worked for them -
each viewing the moral universe through a different lens. This
framework, much like an archeological dig, is organized in succes-
sive layers of structure. My project becomes one of excavation,
through which I want to show how, at increasingly deeper levels of
theory, equality has been torn loose from its moorings in history
and how, within the remaining text of equality, competing interpre-
tations reflecting the lived experiences of minorities have been
erased.
In Part I, "Equality as Historical Memory," I argue that equal-
ity's meaning in the nineteenth century grew directly out of the na-
tional experience with slavery. Both blacks and the legal
community attempted to imagine equality in terms of its opposite:
the conditions of slave life. I argue further that the initial difficulty
was not in defining equality but in reconciling competing world
views, those of former slave owners who wanted to maintain a
traditional social order notwithstanding Appomattox, and those of
blacks and northern Republicans who pursued transformation of
social order. This social order privileged whites to a racially exclu-
sive society in which they enjoyed special status and power vis-a-vis
blacks. The claims of privilege were cloaked in the Reconstruction
debates as claims of autonomy or liberty. Liberty trumped equality
in the realm of social life, the argument went. Thus the dispute was
19.
When I move about my house, I know without thinking about it that walking towards
the bathroom means passing near the bedroom, that looking at the window means hav-
ing the fireplace on my left, and in this small world each gesture, each perception is
immediately located in relation to a great number of possible co-ordinates. When I chat
with a friend whom I know well, each of [our] remarks ... contains, in addition to the
meaning it carries for everybody else, a host of references ... without our needing to
recall previous conversations with each other.... In the same way there is a "world of
thoughts," or a sediment left by our mental processes, which enables us to rely on our
concepts and acquired judgements as we might on things there in front of us ... without
there being any need for us to resynthesize them.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 129-30 (Colin Smith trans.,
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1962) (1945).
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not about the meaning of equality but about whether it had a social
role. Equality failed, I argue, not because of competing claims
about what equality was but because of a convergence of historical
forces - the collapse of a key political coalition and the triumph in
the judicial arena of a paradigm20 of the traditional social order in
which equality has no place.
In Part II, "Equality as Grand Theory," I address contemporary
as opposed to historical conceptions of equality. Here I map the
structure of thinking that seems to underlie the current doctrinal
framework. In the brave new context of "modernity," the terms of
the debate have been reconfigured. At least at the explicit level of
discussion, there is a contest over the meaning of equality.
I begin with the notion that there is a theoretical struggle be-
tween competing communities of interpretation, each understand-
ing equality through a different lens. That lens is what I refer to as
"grand theory."'21 The notion of grand theory here connotes a
foundation for law. Law is grounded in assumptions about the no-
tion of fault, the notion of discrimination, the notion of interpreta-
tion, the notion of law itself. From the perspective of the black
community, the legally operative paradigms of discrimination and
fault are incoherent. I try to identify the epistemic, historical, and
moral dimensions of the struggle over the meaning of equality. I
try to show how the idea of equality is indistinguishable from the
assumptions through which the dominant society has viewed the
question. I argue further that, as the dominant society has con-
20. The word paradigm enters our lexicon through the work of Thomas Kuhn. See
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF ScIENInFIc REVOLUTIONS (1962). Kuhn's work is
both a history of science and a deconstruction of classical notions of knowledge. In histori-
cizing science, Kuhn historicizes the notion of objectivity, showing how evolving conceptions
in science have varied less according to a linear progression of understanding things than
according to the manner in which differing communities have interpreted them. It is in this
postmodern context, in which all truth is a function of the communities that interpret it, that
the concept of a paradigm must be understood.
In simplest terms a paradigm refers to an "accepted model" or "pattern." Id. at 23. A
paradigm is a conceptual device that serves as a shared source qua source of rules and stan-
dards, a source of objectivity itself in that community. See id. at 23-34. Key here is the
notion that theory is not separate from fact: conceptual frameworks or paradigms for under-
standing phenomena are not separate from perception of phenomena. Kuhn explains:
[S]omething like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees de-
pends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual
experience has taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can only be, in'
William James's phrase, "a bloomin' buzzin' confusion."
Id. at 112.
21. Grand theory refers first of all to an ordering of diverse concepts into a perceived
unity. Secondly, grand theory refers to a foundation or grounding for the systematic under-
standing. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS O'
CONSTrruTIONAL LAW (1988) (criticizing grand theory in the context of constitutional law).
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structed it, equality is a concept that operates as a semantic horizon
from which blacks cannot articulate their own victimization.
In Part III, "Equality as Prison," I trace the outlines of thirty
years of discrimination law, that is, the common law of Title VII
and how it culminates in a relentlessly intentionalist model of dis-
crimination. I try to show both the rigidity and the constructedness
of the Court's approach. I trace this meaning simultaneously to a
subjectivist 22 conception of fault and to an atomistic conception of
the discrimination problem. These models in turn are traced back
to the grand theory I have attempted to identify. There is a base-
superstucture relationship between legal doctrine and a grand the-
ory of equality reflecting the world view and experience of the
dominant group. I argue in turn that given this structure, Title VII
law and, implicitly, equality are imprisoning for blacks. Antidis-
crimination law itself becomes a barrier both to social reform and
to discourse.
In Part IV, "Equality as Redemption," I discuss the future of
Title VII as it is contingent upon unbuilding what our dominant
political and legal culture sees as its very foundations. I suggest
that what must be sacrificed is less the foundations of a legal system
than its privileged identities.
I. EQUALITY AS HISTORICAL MEMORY
The nineteenth was the first century of human sympathy[] - the age
when half wonderingly we began to descry in others that transfigured
spark of divinity which we call Myself; when clodhoppers and peas-
ants, and tramps and thieves, and millionaires and - sometimes -
Negroes, became throbbing souls whose warm pulsing life touched us
so nearly that we half gasped with surprise, crying, "Thou too! Hast
Thou seen Sorrow and the dull waters of Hopelessness? Hast Thou
known life?" And then all helplessly we peered into those Other-
22. By subjectivism I mean a focus upon the "subjectivity" or mindset of the individual as
the object of inquiry in a discrimination case. This is subjectivism as a theory of fault. Com-
pare that meaning with subjectivism as a theory of knowledge. This is referred to as Pythago-
reanism and essentially holds that truth is as each individual sees it. See PLATO, THEAETETUS
(Benjamin H. Kennedy trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1881). Epistemological subjectivism is
not the subject of my discussion. My essay does, however, implicitly reject this form of sub-
jectivism as well, and posits that there are moral truths, such as that it is wrong to try to injure
someone simply because he is black.
My criticisms of subjectivism as a moral theory or theory of fault are interrelated with my
critique of objectivism as a theory of language. Both of my critiques are limited to the nar-
row context of the discourse about equality occurring within the law of Title VII. Subjectiv-
ism as a moral theory is bad because it leads to mentalistic inquiries that are impossible and
does not address the lived conditions blacks face. Objectivism is bad in context as a theory of
language because it is used to posit as "true" this "bad" subjectivist interpretation of equality
as the only notion of equality.
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worlds and wailed, "0 World of Worlds, how shall man make you
one?" 23
From the vantage point of history,24 the idea of equality as a
vehicle for discourse about the hopes and aspirations of blacks is
itself problematic. Before the Civil War and during Reconstruc-
tion,25 blacks and their allies - first abolitionists and later northern
Republicans as well - framed the discussion in terms of freedom
and citizenship. The primacy of the discussion of citizenship reso-
nates in the infamous Dred Scott decision.2 6 In Chief Justice
Taney's opinion the question was whether a black man, slave or
manumitted, could become a citizen.27 This question was the pivot
upon which rested not only Dred Scott's claim of freedom qua free-
dom but also the legal rationalization of racial subordination, in the
form of slavery.28 Slave society presumed a radical and essential
23. W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 159 (Fawcett Publications
1961) (1903).
24. Our political history and our intellectual history, particularly the history of how the
discourse of equality evolved, are mutually entailed.
Abstract changes in moral concepts are always embodied in real, particular events....
There ought not to be two histories, one of political and moral action and one of political
and moral theorizing, because there were not two pasts, one populated only by actions,
the other only by theories. Every action is the bearer and expression of more or less
theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing and every expression of be-
lief is a political and moral action.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 61 (2d ed. 1984).
25. Eric Foner dates this "Radical Reconstruction" period from 1867 - when "Radical
Republicans" in Congress "swept aside Southern governments ... and fastened black suf-
frage upon the defeated South" - to 1877, the date of the Hayes-Tilden Compromise when,
in exchange for favorable resolution of a dispute over the presidency, the Republicans agreed
to remove the Northern troops that had enforced civil rights laws. See ERIC FONER, RECON-
STRUCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1867, at xix (1988). During Recon-
struction a panoply of civil rights laws were passed, and blacks were elected to office and
began numerous businesses. These black gains were largely swept away after 1877. Id. at
602.
26. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The Taney Court held,
inter alia, that Dred Scott remained a slave despite his temporary sojourn in the "free state"
of Illinois. 60 U.S. at 452-53. In Chief Justice Taney's view, Scott's claims relied on the
notion that he could be a U.S. citizen capable of suing in U.S. courts. Taney asserted that the
original intent of the Constitution was that neither slaves nor their descendants were "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the Constitution. See 60 U.S. at 411-12. See generally DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE (1978).
27. Taney framed the issue as follows:
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this coun-
try, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to
all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarant[e]ed by that instrument to the
citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in
the cases specified in the Constitution.
60 U.S. at 403.
28. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERA-
TIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 140 (1981).
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difference between black slaves and their white masters.29 This es-
sential difference was expressed in the first instance by the fact that
slaves were property30 and concomitantly by the fact that slaves had
no rights.3 1 This knotting together of the categories of slave and
property in turn expressed, roughly, an equation between slave and
nonperson. Because slaves were property, because they were enti-
ties without rights, the statuses of slave and citizen were by defini-
tion mutually exclusive. But what was the source of the slave's
inferiority? It was clear, of course, that slaves were not citizens and
not included within the sovereign community, but was this disability
a function of their status as slaves or of their status as blacks? If the
legally, artificially created status of slave was the only rationale for
the dichotomy between slave and citizen, the whole scheme of
master-slave relations would be tautological and without founda-
tion in reason. Thus, if the status of citizen included blacks, the
legal bonds that bound white masters and slaves in their respective
places could potentially unravel.
The idea of citizenship that Dred Scott infamously constitution-
alized denied blacks this right of inclusion. The Dred Scott opinion
articulates that idea as follows:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
29. As Winthrop Jordan explains,
Even in an age thoroughly accustomed to the hovering omnipresence of early death, the
enormous toll of Negro life must have caused many white men to withdraw in silent
horror, to refuse to admit identity with a people they were methodically slaughtering
year after year.... To the horrified witness of a scene of torture, the victim becomes a
"poor devil," a "mangled creature." He is no longer a man. He can no longer be human
because to credit him with one's own human attributes would be too horrible.
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 233 (1968). This phenomenon of denial was
facilitated by law that defined slaves as property. See D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visi-
ble: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEo. L.J. 437 (1993) (arguing that the categories
of master and slave and the opposition between the categories were the foundation of the
slave system as a system of both social and legal relations).
30. Thus, Harriet Beecher Stowe could write:
The slave-code.., of the Southern States, is designed to keep millions of human beings
in the condition of chattels personal; to keep them in a condition in which the master
may sell them, dispose of their time, person, and labour; in which they can do nothing,
possess nothing, and acquire nothing, except for the benefit of the master; in which they
are doomed in themselves ....
HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 132 (Arno Press 1968) (1852).
31.
Each slave state regulated the condition of slavery through codes of laws.... The
slave could not own personal property, rent real estate, make any civil contract, or law-
fully be taught to read and write .... Thus he could not bear witness against his master,
nor could he institute suit in his own behalf.
PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS: FROM THE EMERGENCE OF THE COT-rON
KINGDOM TO THE EVE OF THE COMPROMISE OF 1850, at 105 (1983).
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had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of mer-
chandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This
opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of
the white race.32
It is not a power to raise to the rank of a citizen any one.., who...
belongs to an inferior and subordinate class.33
Thus, Dred Scott placed the imprimatur of constitutional law upon
the primary assumption of slave society: blacks were an inferior
order of human life unfit for citizenship.
The primacy of citizenship in the original discussion is reflected
equally in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified
in 1868, whose purpose was to overrule Dred Scott and guarantee,
in Justice Harlan's words, "civil freedom" 34 to blacks: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. '35
To frame a discussion in terms of citizenship was to create a
structure for discourse with three dimensions, by placing back-
ground and foreground in view. 36 To place citizenship as a unit of
political community in the foreground implied as background for
discussion our understanding of the democratic commitments of
that political community. This bound up our democratic under-
standings in a context that would always and already be present in
any discussion of the meaning or minima of citizenship. It follows
that the premises of democracy are inextricably linked to notions of
the social contract running between the state and its citizens.37 This
32. 60 U.S. at 407,
33. 60 U.S. at 417.
34. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34-35 (1883) (arguing that the purpose of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was substantive - to "free" blacks, to elevate them
to the level of white citizens, and not merely to abolish slavery).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. In a real sense citizenship provided a "baseline" for inquiry. Legal concepts that ap-
pear in the doctrinal foreground depend on background assumptions for perspective and
evaluation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1987)
(speaking of common law assumptions - the background - as the unarticulated baseline
against which departures are measured and determined to be constitutional violations). I
trace the concept of baseline to Robert Hale's work. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 PoL. Sci. Q. 470, 472-77 (1923) (arguing
that a background distribution of entitlements determines our perception of what constitutes
coercion by the state).
37. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATisE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690). Locke, writing originally in 1690, was a great proponent
of a contractual notion of government - the idea that government had power coterminous
with the consent of the "commonwealth." See id. at 73-74. This implied an implicit "con-
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social contract meant that individuals had moral claims against the
state. As a framework for discussing the claims of blacks, citizen-
ship explicitly included a substantive dimension of rights and privi-
leges. Citizenship pointed directly to a notion that the state had
affirmative duties to blacks as citizens and that correlatively blacks
had affirmative rights that the state had an obligation to "protect."
It was precisely this framework of citizenship that provided the
idiom of the civil rights movement and resonated in claims by
blacks that they were relegated to the status of "second-class citi-
zens." This is to say that the animating notions of equality opera-
tive in the civil rights movement took their meaning and content
from the experience of the absence of equality.
The memory of slavery, actively preserved as a living intellectual re-
source in their expressive political culture, helped them to generate a
new set of answers to this enquiry. They had to fight - often through
their spirituality - to hold on to the unity of ethics and politics sun-
dered from each other by modernity's insistence that the true, the
good, and the beautiful had distinct origins and belonged to different
domains of knowledge. 38
Equality seems to emerge as an instrumental concept in the dis-
cussion about equal protection that occurred in the Reconstruction-
era debates about how to secure the equal citizenship of blacks.
Doctrinally, this point is obscured by the Slaughter-House
Cases,39 which formally limited the scope of the Privileges or Immu-
nities (of citizenship) Clause in the context of claims by white busi-
nessmen. In Slaughter-House the Louisiana state legislature gave a
twenty-five year monopoly to a particular slaughterhouse company
to land and slaughter livestock. 40 This cramped the ability of previ-
ous slaughterhouse owners and butchers to practice their trade and
profession. The plaintiffs seized upon the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a possible source of protection of the fundamental civil
rights associated with natural law: "[t]he right to oneself, to one's
own faculties, physical and intellectual." 41 These fundamental
rights, in the plaintiffs' view, extended to the right to practice one's
profession.42 The Supreme Court accepted that these fundamental
tract" between the government and the governed and indefeasible limitations on govern-
mental power.
38. PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC 39 (1993).
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
40. 83 U.S. at 36.
41. 83 U.S. at 45 (citing M.A. THIERS, DE LA PROPR1tri 36,47 (Paris, Imprim6 Par Plon
Fr~res 1848)).
42. 83 U.S. at 45-48.
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rights existed but suggested that the state, not the federal govern-
ment, was the guarantor of basic civil rights generally.43 The Court
adopted a structural reading 44 of the Constitution, emphasizing that
the first eleven amendments were directed at confining federal
power and inferring that the core danger with which the Constitu-
tion concerned itself was the danger posed by federal power.45 As a
result, the Slaughter-House Cases severely circumscribed the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause and emptied it of natural law norms.
The Slaughter-House Court reduced the command of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to a procedural rule that rights be allocated
evenhandedly with respect to citizens of different states.46
Despite this foray into a procedural model with respect to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, citizenship at an implicit level con-
tinued to shape the contours of the Equal Protection Clause. Equal
protection, at least in the context of political rights, became a con-
ceptual vehicle for the idea of equal citizenship; it was in a sense an
effort to concretize or to define more precisely the duties of govern-
ment to newly freed slaves. A key point here is that to the extent
equality is a term of debate for all parties, it implicitly encompasses
historical experience. As a Reconstruction notion, equality was ep-
istemically grounded in a historical context within the memory of
the key players in the debate.
This notion of equality as prescriptive of a set of affirmative ob-
ligations upon government to blacks - which we will call the "his-
torical model" - resonates deeply in Strauder v. West Virginia.47
43. 83 U.S. at 78-79.
44. By structural reading I refer to a textualist theory of constitutional interpretation that
attempts to discern the meaning of the Constitution from the relationship between its various
amendments and articles. Cass Sunstein explains,
Courts often respond to the various problems in textual approaches by reference to
other parts of the text and, more importantly for our purposes, to the structure of the
statute. On this view, an interpretation should be disfavored if it would make the dis-
puted position fit awkwardly with another provision or produce internal redundancy or
confusion.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 425
(1989). The classic work here is CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
45. 83 U.S. at 82.
46.
[The] sole purpose [of the Privileges or Immunities Clause] was to declare to the several
States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or
as you limit.., or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less,
shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
83 U.S. at 77; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) ("The primary purpose of
the [Privileges or Immunities Clause] ... was . . . to insure to a citizen of State A who
ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.").
47. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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In Strauder a black man convicted of murder challenged the consti-
tutionality of his conviction on the ground that state law officially
preempted blacks from serving on either the grand or petit jury that
decided his fate.48
The issue in Strauder as the Court framed it was, in the first
instance, whether "in the composition or selection of jurors by
whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color
may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so
that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury. ' '49 This
question of what the state may or may not do was not a question of
Mr. Strauder's particular rights: "[The question] is not whether a
colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him,
has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part of
persons of his own race... ."50 Moreover, there was no issue as to
whether Strauder was denied a fair trial, and not even a claim of
any causal nexus between the exclusion of blacks and the outcome
in Strauder's case. The question was simply one of power: Could
the state deny blacks the opportunity to participate in the area of
government delimited by the jury process? The Court held that it
could not.51 A key element of the Court's rationale was the notion
that equality involves affirmative protections or "immunities,"
which, through the Equal Protection Clause, delineated strict limits
on state authority:
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they con-
tain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most val-
uable to the colored race[ ] - the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored[] - exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their ... rights . . . and discriminations which are steps
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.52
This proscription against official efforts to subordinate blacks or to
reduce them in status flowed from the purposes of the Reconstruc-
tion-era amendments as a whole:
No one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in all the amendments, lying at the foundation of each.., the
freedom of the slave race ... and the protection of the newly made
48. The West Virginia statute read, in pertinent part, "All white male persons who are
twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors,
except as herein provided." 100 U.S. at 305 (quoting 1873 W. Va. Acts 102).
49. 100 U.S. at 305.
50. 100 U.S. at 305.
51. 100 U.S. at 305.
52. 100 U.S. at 307-08.
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•.. citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over [him].53
This interpretation of the purpose of the Reconstruction-era
amendments was in turn grounded in historical context:
[I]t required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those
who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would,
when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon withjealousy and positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or
enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed.5 4
It followed that the West Virginia statute was unconstitutional be-
cause of the impermissible state purpose or motive the Court found
to be clear in the statute: to reduce the legal status of blacks as a
class. The Court explained:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied
by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in
other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed
by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that
race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of
the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.55
Three things are clear from Strauder. First, the unit of moral
inquiry is the group rather than the individual.5 6 Strauder proceeds
from a historically grounded concern about the subordination of
blacks and a concern in modern terms about the specter of racial
caste. Second, Strauder recognizes, again by situating itself within a
historical context, that equal-protection-based equality has a sub-
stantive dimension: it presumes the existence of a class of imper-
missible ends that the state absolutely may not pursue - for
example, to place blacks in an inferior legal status vis-A-vis whites.
The notion was that blacks as a group could not be subordinated by
law to whites. The problematic of equality was framed in terms of a
claim of right to stand on the same plane of legal status. Third, and
perhaps most important to my theme in this Part, it follows that
53. 100 U.S. at 307 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873))
(emphasis added).
54. 100 U.S. at 306 (emphasis added).
55. 100 U.S. at 308.
56.
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive
atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it
happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already
one of the prime effects of power that... certain discourses, certain desires, come to be
identified and constituted as individuals. The individual ... is not the vis-d-vis of power;
it is, I believe, one of its prime effects.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 78, 98 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
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equality, as understood in Strauder, mirrors the concept of citizen-
ship and seems to take its meaning from the meaning of citizenship
itself.
The idea of equality as such represented a claim to redistribu-
tion and reallocation of rights, duties, and, ultimately, power be-
tween blacks and their former masters in the South. This notion of
equality as a constitutionally or federally imposed norm requiring a
reorganization of social order collided, of course, with antebellum
southern assumptions about the social world - assumptions that
remained unchanged by either Appomattox or the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. During Reconstruction these assumptions
found expression in a challenge not to the meaning but to the scope
of equality norms. The classic expression was that of Senator
Joshua Hill during the debates about the Civil Rights Act of 1875:
I must confess, sir, that I cannot see the magnitude of this subject.
I object to this great Government descending to the business of regu-
lating the hotels and the common taverns of this country, and the
street railroads, stage-coaches, and everything of that sort. It looks to
me to be a petty business for the Government of the United States
57
What he may term a right may be the right of any man that pleases to
come into my parlor and to be my guest. That is not the right of any
colored man upon earth, nor of any white man, unless it is agreeable
to me.58
Hill's framework involved two key features. First, the social
contract creates a private sphere, including the home and presuma-
bly one's private property, in which the individual is sovereign.
Second, there is a structure to federal-state relations in our consti-
tutional scheme. The federal government and state government
represent dual planes of authority. The federal government may
not descend to the level of private individual relations. In the zone
of privacy created under this conception, government has no right
to impose rules or values. This is a zone of liberty. In this model
the protection of minorities is simply a governmental objective in
tension with the indefeasible rights of the individual. It follows that
this model posits liberty as in tension with equality but lexically
prior59 in the hierarchy of values.
57. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Hill).
58. Id.
59. Lexical priority is a phrase I have borrowed from John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JusTicE 42-45 (1971). It is helpful as a heuristic here in appreciating how differ-
ent political and discursive communities engage in ordering and ranking of values.
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This classical approach made no challenge to the meaning of
equality, but it did make the severest effort to constrain its bounda-
ries and scope, limiting its meaning to a certain public sphere of life.
Congress rejected Hill's approach in the Reconstruction debates.
During the golden historical moment of Reconstruction, however,
the rejection of Hill's approach reflected the prevailing power rela-
tions between the northern-Republican-controlled Congress and
the defeated South. Those power relations changed in the after-
math of the Hayes-Tilden compromise. 60 Concomitantly, in this af-
termath, Hill's framework was written into law in the Civil Rights
Cases.61
The Civil Rights Cases arose out of a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.62 The Act prohibited, inter
alia, discrimination on the basis of race in public accommodations,
and it provided both criminal and civil liability for persons violating
provisions of the Act. The Civil Rights Cases consolidated criminal
appeals in four cases - appealing convictions for denying blacks
admission to inns, hotels, and theaters - and an appeal of a civil
penalty in another. The question, as the Court framed it, was "[h]as
Congress constitutional power to make such a law?" 63
The question of the Act's constitutionality flowed from "an in-
genious verbal criticism" 64 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
60. The Hayes-Tilden compromise represented a reconciliation of North and South at the
expense of southern blacks. Tilden, the Democratic candidate and a favorite of southern
whites, had orchestrated a campaign of fraud, calculated violence, and intimidation against
blacks. "[T]hroughout the Deep South, black belt Democrats either barred freedmen from
the polls (Yazoo County[, Mississippi] recorded only two votes for Hayes) or stuffed the
ballot boxes to 'make it appear the negroes voted with them.'" FONER, supra note 25, at 575.
Although Tilden did not do well enough for a colorable claim for recount, his tactics dis-
rupted the electoral count enough that he was able to negotiate the removal of Northern
troops in exchange for a concession of counting irregularities - irregularities he and his
supporters had deliberately caused. Perhaps the remarks that best sum up what happened
come from a colloquy between Jerry Moore, a former slave and head of a Republican club,
and his landlord. During the period leading up to the election, Moore warned his white
landlord against violence against blacks: "Mind what you are doing .... the United States is
mighty strong." Unfazed, the landlord replied, "[B]ut Thornton .... the northern people is
on our side." Id. at 574.
61. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
62. This Act established that
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances on land and water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, § 1.
63. 109 U.S. at 10.
64. 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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part of the Court. This criticism involved two rhetorical moves.
The Fourteenth Amendment reads,
All persons born.., in the United States ... are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.65
By juridical slight of hand, the Court simply ignored the first sen-
tence of the Fourteenth Amendment altogether.66 This was the first
step. The second telling step was to posit - not to argue but
merely to posit - that the Amendment ought to be interpreted
literally.67 The Court went on to posit, further, that the phrase no
state is a phrase of limitation, limiting the scope and ambit of con-
gressional power under Section Five.68
It follows that Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment is coterminous with state action:
[The Fourteenth Amendment] does not authorize Congress to create
a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to
provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the
action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subver-
sive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.69
The court had written into constitutional law a scheme of federal-
state relations in which federal and state governments were rele-
gated to separate planes of power. Moreover, the dividing line be-
tween state power and federal authority tracked the dividing line
between private action - the acts of individuals - and state ac-
tion, which was of "public" concern.
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by [State] authority, is
simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual .... An individ-
ual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy
and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness or a juror; ... unless
protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State
authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right .... It must assume
that in the cases provided for, the evil or wrong actually committed
rests upon some State law or State authority for its excuse and
perpetration.70
65. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. See 109 U.S. at 11 (quoting the Fourteenth Amendment without the first sentence).
67. See 109 U.S. at 11.
68. See 109 U.S. at 11.
69. 109 U.S. at 11.
70. 109 U.S. at 17-18.
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These principles of interpretation were not woven out of whole
cloth; rather, they reflected precisely the notions earlier spun out on
the Senate floor by Joshua Hill and purportedly rejected by the Re-
construction Congress. "The Court in the Civil Rights Cases
reverses the statutory outcome of the [Reconstruction debates].
The [C]ourt substitutes Hill's conception of discrimination as a mat-
ter of private choice for Sumner's Radical Republican conception
of discrimination as a deprivation of rights. ' 71
Given this revisionist interpretation of the limits of federal civil
rights laws, the Court held the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitu-
tional as an ultra vires act of Congress - a specious intermeddling
in local and private affairs without textual warrant in the Equal Pro-
tection or Due Process Clauses. 72
Following the Civil Rights Cases, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause fell into desuetude. The failure of
the historical model of equality to transform race relations, how-
ever, must not obscure a basic point: in the Reconstruction era,
equality guarded a claim by blacks not to be relegated as a group to
a subordinate, inferior legal status. Equality was a slogan or vehicle
for the substantive goals of blacks to become part of the sover-
eignty defined as "We the People." The collapse of this framework
reflected the collapse of the coalition of freed slaves and northern
Republicans. I submit this history as prologue to the story of equal-
ity as it plays out in the federal common law of Title VII.
II. EQUALITY AS GRAND THEORY
Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a
catastrophe.... [A] Know-Nothing political movement takes power
and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities,
imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is
a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people
seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it
was. But all that they possess are fragments: ... half-chapters from
books, single pages from articles, not always fully legible because torn
and charred.
What is the point of constructing this imaginary world... ? The
hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which
we inhabit the language of [equality] is in the same state of grave
71. Jones, supra note 17, at 62-63,
72. 109 U.S. at 11-13.
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disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world...
just described.73
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,74 as a historical event,
defines the juncture between two eras of our nation's history: the
era of segregation and the era of civil rights. It mediates also be-
tween minorities and those who employ them, between victims of
discrimination and those who perpetrate it. Located as it is at a
discursive juncture of historic, legal, and political conflict, Title VII,
far from resolving conflict, itself becomes the theater for its contin-
uation. Title VII represents equally a reawakening of dormant
ideals and the political and legal struggle over the limits of those
ideals.
Title VII formally collapsed this framework of public and pri-
vate spheres on which segregation in the marketplace had rested.
The purpose and design of Title VII was to eradicate segregation -
to integrate blacks into the economic mainstream. The social goal
of Title VII was the reciprocal of the world view it replaced. Dis-
crimination on the basis of race no longer fit into the world as Title
VII had reordered it.
In a real sense Title VII sought to break down the wall - the
wall of individual and institutional decisionmaking that operated as
a barrier to blacks. Implicit here as well was the goal of breaking
down the discursive wall of contractarian claims that had prevented
the norms of equality from finding their proper expression in the
marketplace. But while Title VII formally erased Hill's framework
of public and private spheres that had hobbled Reconstruction ef-
forts, it failed to erase classical assumptions - about social order,
individual rights - internal to the paradigm.75
In prohibiting discrimination, Title VII presumes a certain norm
of equality applicable to the workplace. But equality is only an ab-
sent presence within the text of the statute; it is nowhere defined. It
is the meaning of equality, a terrain not mapped by the text of the
statute, that becomes contested territory claimed by two competing
communities of interpretation, by two competing views of the social
73. MACINrYRE, supra note 24, at 1-2. In this passage MacIntyre is actually discussing
"the language of morality," but his parable seems also to illuminate our consideration of the
language of equality.
74. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20OOe-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
75. I would identify these internal assumptions as follows: (i) the unequal distribution of
wealth and power between blacks and whites is natural and inevitable; (ii) the rights of the
individual are prior to social or group concerns; and (iii) legislation may not be redistributive
or deny individual rights in favor of group concerns.
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world. The two perspectives diverge diametrically as to how they
construct two concepts: the concept of the wrong to be addressed
and the concept of moral responsibility or fault. The two concepts
are as inextricably linked as chicken and egg: the paradigm of dis-
crimination leads to a particular notion of responsibility and vice
versa.
A. Competing Paradigms of Discrimination
For all concerned, the concept of equality pivots on an under-
standing of what the evil to be addressed is and on the epistemology
that validates that understanding.
From the baseline of historical experience, racism appears as a
monolithic pattern of systematic exclusion and subordination of
blacks to whites in every area of endeavor germane to life.76 What
is essential to this view is the idea that racism is coextensive with
the conditions and forms of life for a member of a perpetual under-
class.77 Moreover, the significance of racial subordination, of being
the lowest paid or the last hired, lies not in the individual instance
of being denied a job but in the significance of the denial within a
social context that connotes inferiority and stigma.78
The stigma flow[s] not from the isolated fact of the denial, but from
the specific denials' relation to a pattern of denials which resonate
and reverberate throughout American society, all tending to declare
particular minorities inferior or limited to a certain place. The stigma
flow[s] from the fact that each denial of opportunity, in the context of
the larger pattern, carries with it an increment of prediction that fu-
ture denials lie ahead.79
76. See JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY (1972) (examining slavery as a
culture); FONER, supra note 31 (surveying the history of black Americans from Africa to the
emergence of the cotton kingdom); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972) (providing a portrait of antebellum southern plantation
life); SAUNDERS REDDING, THEY CAME IN CHAINS: AMERICANS FROM AFRICA (rev. ed.
1973) (examining slavery as a defining experience for black Americans); see also W.E.B. Du
BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (Frank Cass & Co. 1966) (1935) (detailing the
plight of blacks from 1860 to 1880); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, The Two Worlds of Race: A Histori-
cal View, in RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 132 (1989) (exploring the extent to
which legalized segregation created for blacks a distinct and inferior world from that of
whites); A. LEON HIGGINnOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978) (examining
through the lens of legal history the experiences of slaves and "freedmen" in colonial
America).
77. See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1088-93, 1099-
102, 1107-14 (1978).
78. See D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45
VAND. L. REv. 349, 374 (1992).
79. Id. at 365.
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The wrongfulness of a particular employer decision has no mean-
ing, no significance as discrimination in itself. Rather, history and the
social milieu in which we are situated create the significance of a bi-
ased decision.... [A] single employer with a wrongful state of mind
cannot cause the stigma of discrimination because discrimination...
requires a social... dimension to exist.80
White racism is a social practice, not a creature of individual
choice. Although blacks may speak of "individual" racism, "it is an
evil that takes its meaning from a somber mosaic of oppression that
stretches across the social landscape and deep into history."8'
Racism, as a social or group practice, is expressed through the
image of "the white man."82 The figure of the white man personi-
fies whites as a group and serves as a metaphor of a predicament in
which oppression is a faceless entity that transcends individual
subjectivity.
The evil to be addressed here is not the individualistic concern
of deprivation of a right to associate with whites or the liberal con-
cern with the wrongfulness of considering race83 but the group con-
cern84 with how rights and power are distributed in society between
80. Id. at 366.
81. Id. at 375.
82. The figure of the white man personifies the idea of racism as a social institution as
omnipresent as whites themselves. The white man, at least until recently, occupied a highly
prominent place in black protest literature and political thought. See, e.g., Du Bois, supra
note 23, at 137 (speaking of the white man as he who binds both blacks and himself with the
"Black" and the "White belt"); ALEX HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MALCOLM X 201 (1964) (referring to the "white man" as he who is "controll[ing]" black
people through dependence upon his material goods); see also THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK
2 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970). The October 1966 Black Panther Party Platform and Program
stated, "We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community," and
went on to identify this figure as "this racist government" and the "American racist." Id.
(emphasis added); see also DEREK WALCOTr, Ti-Jean and His Brothers, in DREAM ON MON-
KEY MOUNTAIN AND OTHER PLAYS 81, 98 (1970) (depicting "the devil" as a "white master"
and the source of evil in society); Jones, supra note 78, at 375.
83. This liberalism was uncritically embraced in the civil rights-era slogan, "Judge me by
the content of my character, not by the color of my skin." Moreover, many blacks insist on
liberal, individualistic notions of equality. My point is to suggest that these models are incon-
sistent with the historical experience of blacks and the social context of racism in which ra-
cism occurs as a social pattern. Both racism and racists are socially constructed. This is not
to say that racial oppression does not exist but only that to understand it as a phenomenon of
individual choices is artificial.
84. By group concern I refer to the idea that the group, rather than the individual, is the
proper unit of moral inquiry. This implies that individuals are constituted by groups and not
the other way around. See FOUCAULT, supra note 56.
A number of legal scholars have embraced this as a moral framework. The classic is
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1971)
(arguing for a group rights model based on a concern about "racial caste"); see also ROBERTO
M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 236-89 (1984) (positing a theory of politics based on
"organic group affiliations"); Kimberl W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988)
(conceiving of racism as an attempt by the dominant group's whites to cast blacks in the role
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the races. As a social problem the focus is on the hierarchical rela-
tionship between blacks and whites. In these terms, the practice of
individuals making distinctions based on color is only a vehicle for
the institution of racial hierarchy85 and the maintenance of power
relations that define that hierarchy.
The epistemic anchor for this interpretation of the problem is
synchronically and diachronically the black experience. Blacks ex-
perience humanity through its negation. We have been treated as
slaves, as second-class citizens, as bodies without minds, as an infer-
ior order of "human" life, as objects.86 It is our group experiences
- the experience of racial caste, of subordination based on one's
race - that defines discrimination. It is, in fact, the experience of
racism, not biology or even culture, that defines being black.
If the lens through which blacks understand racism is their own
experience, the lens through which the larger society comprehends
the concept is the lens of its assumptions about the self and other.
of the "other"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (arguing that dealing effectively with
racism requires recognizing the unconscious beliefs one group has about another). More-
over, the dichotomy between those who adopt individualist and group rights models is often
used as a heuristic to understand the tensions within the discourse about equality occurring
simultaneously under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. See Richard H. Fallon &
Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REv.
1 (characterizing the tension as between a model of group justice and a model of individual
justice); see also Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Comment: Metro Broad-
casting Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARv. L. Rav. 107 (1990) (arguing that
the Court must choose between retired Justice Brennan's collectivist vision and Justice
O'Connor's individualist vision of equal protection).
But in speaking of the group-rights model as a victim's perspective, I am speaking of
something beyond the discourse of academics, of something that is entrenched within the
political culture of blacks as an animating view of the world. This is evident from language.
Thus, blacks and their allies often speak of "artificial barriers" to equal rights. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (adopting this language). Moreover, the EEOC
continues to speak of "underutilization" of minorities. See, e.g., Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1993). In the context of advising employers
on the use of tests, the EEOC suggests, tracing the normative arc of Griggs, that "Federal
enforcement agencies may draw an inference of adverse impact ... if the user has an under-
utilization of a group in the job category .... 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1993).
85. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 953, 1014 (1993) ("[T]he explicit use
of racial classifications ... [was a] vehicle of racial oppression; structural and institutional
racism ... now are the predominant causes of blacks' continued inability to thrive in this
society."); see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protec-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986).
86.
In the African communal group, ties of family and blood, of mother and child, of group
relationship, made the group leadership strong .... In the case of the more artificial
group among American Negroes, there are sources of strength in common memories of
suffering in the past; in present threats of degradation and extinction; in common ambi-
tions and ideals; in emulation and the determination to prove ability and desert.
W.E.B. Du Bois, DUSK OF DAWN 219 (Kraus Thomson Org., Ltd. 1975) (1940).
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The dominant society's concept of discrimination involves two in-
terpenetrating narratives, each grounded ultimately in notions of
individual subjectivity.8 7 There is in this an implicit reference to the
Enlightenment idea that human subjectivity creates human identity
and worth.88 This larger-society or traditional view is, in its abstrac-
tion, in its epistemic stance, in its focus on individual subjectivity,
the exact reverse of the black perspective.
The traditional notion of prejudice89 posits man as a rational
actor who must act logically if he is to realize his individuality and
conform to society. It follows that prejudice is an irrational act, and
more specifically an irrational response to the fact of race.90 The
specific irrationality is in making a prejudgment about an individual
on the basis of membership in a group. It is in the first instance a
problem of thinking illogically. The linchpin of this notion of preju-
dice is that the individual mind or individual character, not one's
status as a member of a group, is what counts, particularly for pur-
poses of identity. Cogito ergo sum.91 I think therefore I am. This
notion of prejudice postulates individual identity as constituted by
individual subjectivity and the capacity to reason. Prejudice, then,
is a kind of intellectual heresy, a deviationist thinking; prejudice
constitutes identity in terms of the group.
Prejudice as irrational and deviationist is also associated with
irrational emotions, such as hatred or fear of someone who is differ-
87. See FOUCAULT, supra note 56, at 98.
88. See ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE - Music - TExcr 142
(Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (decrying the hegemony of Enlightenment notions of autono-
mous individual subjectivity as that which is the arbiter of meaning as authoritarian).
Barthes writes about foundationalism in the context of interpretation as it relates to the arts,
but there is a parallel foundationalism in law, particularly in the doctrine of Title VII.
89. My discussion of the concept of prejudice here is merely to sketch the outline of it as
it relates to my argument about the nexus between the concept of discrimination and liberal
conceptions of the subject. This is obviously part of a much more vast discussion. See, e.g.,
JORDAN, supra note 29, at 234-36; JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 83
(1970). I would also note that the concept of racism is itself, arguably, part of the structure of
ideas that maintain racial hierarchy. See Jones, supra note 29, at 437.
90. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATrURE OF PREJUDICE 3-15 (1954).
91. This proposition lies at the heart of Descartes's phenomenology, in which he posited
that a philosophical system could be grounded on this "self-evident" truth. He premised the
indisputability of individual subjects as validated by individual consciousness. See RENt
DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES 131 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., rev. ed. 1968). Descartes's
assumptions are at the core of the Enlightenment project of which liberal legal theory is a
subset. A generation of poststructuralist thought grew up in challenge to Descartes. See, e.g.,
JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 14 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press
1982) (1972); FOUCAULT, supra note 56. For a law professor's critique of Cartesian assump-
tions, see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78
CAL. L. REv. 1441 (1990).
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ent.92 This image of prejudice crystallized during the civil rights
movement, when whites saw Governor Faubus preventing little
Autherine Lucy93 from attending a segregated school, sending her
home with spittle literally dripping from her dress; when helpless
blacks were sent reeling by the high-pressure hoses of southern fire
departments; when images of women and children bludgeoned by
southern police came into white living rooms. These irrational
emotions are understood, in implicitly Freudian terms, as animalis-
tic urges or responses that a reasonable person must keep in check.
The idea of prejudice is parasitic upon the idea of carnal desire. As
sexuality threatens individual subjectivity by threatening to sub-
merge it in a pool of irrational impulses, so does prejudice, to a
lesser degree but in the same way, present a similar threat.
This idea of prejudice also traces to a narrative about sin. Preju-
dice is something low that we must get beyond to-reach our higher
selves. There is an implicit analogy between the impulse to preju-
dice and the impulse to illicit sexual knowledge. The mythology of
race, with its deep concern with essences and blood, is a kind of
knowledge the higher self must repress.
The theme that recurs between these two narratives is the no-
tion that prejudice is a choice or decision, irrational or immoral or
both - a product of individual subjectivity. The source of this
model of prejudice is not experience but a set of texts, including
theology and Enlightenment assumptions about the autonomous
subject.
The paradigm of discrimination as a problem of individual sub-
jectivity leads unerringly to a legal framework in which the evil to
be addressed is discriminatory decisions or choices. Discrimination
becomes a procedural concept concerned with ensuring that each
employment decision is made neutrally, free of illicit "intent." The
illicit decision premise was perhaps best stated by Professor
Blumstein:
Because the nondiscrimination notion is a procedural concept assur-
ing evenhanded treatment of similarly situated individuals, it is
breached when similarly situated people are treated differently be-
92. There is a biblical connection here: "But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be
unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself .. " Leviticus 19:34.
93. Autherine Lucy was the little girl whose court-ordered admission to a formerly segre-
gated Little Rock, Arkansas school led to a showdown between Governor Orville Faubus of
Arkansas and President Eisenhower. The state defied the court order and at the same time
went to court to seek postponement of the order. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Autherine Lucy in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See also J. HARVIE WILKINSON III,
FROM BROIN TO BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTERATION: 1954-1978, at
88-95 (1979).
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cause of their race. Such differential treatment has an essential ingre-
dient of volition, and a finding of unconstitutional discrimination
therefore rests on a finding of intent.94
In this iron paradigm, discrimination always originates in, and is co-
terminous with, an employer's decision to treat similarly situated
persons differently.
The idea of discrimination as a creature of decisions leads to the
idea that fair employment laws can police only decisions tainted by
discriminatory animus.95 The line dividing between racial animus
and the employer's taste - to hire and fire whom he pleases for
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all 96 - again becomes the
dividing line between public and private spheres of decisionmaking.
This densely abstract, conceptual scheme of what the problem is
is quintessentially an outsider's viewpoint. The idea that discrimi-
nation is a creature of decision is not merely detached from the
experience of blacks; it is a viewpoint that, in its focus on individual
mindset rather than on objective conditions, in its epistemic
grounding not in experience but in the assumptions of the Enlight-
enment, is altogether the opposite of blacks' perspective. The tradi-
tional view of the larger society is not merely inconsistent but
incommensurate with the view of blacks.97 Through the lens of
these traditional assumptions, the lived experience of blacks is en-
tirely incomprehensible. These two communities of interpretation
contend, on an uneven terrain of vastly differing degrees of privi-
lege and power, over the meaning of equality.
Implicit in this struggle between political and interpretive com-
munities is a struggle over interpretive and linguistic assumptions.
The conservative side of the debate sees the arbiter of textual
meaning as either plain meaning or the intent of the legislature or
94. James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 643-44 (1983).
The operative image within Blumstein's paradigm is the image of equality as a "balance." A
scale is balanced when its two hands are level or "even" with one another. See Jones, supra
note 17, at 28. In our context, employers treat people equally when they are "evenhanded,"
or when they act as "evenhanded" employers.
95. See Blumstein, supra note 94, at 643-45 (arguing that this naturally or inevitably limits
the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws).
96. One must "grant[ ] fullest rein to an employer's discretion to hire, promote, or fire for
a 'good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all'...." Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 997
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
97. They are classic instances of incommensurate viewpoints in that "the whole concep-
tual web" is shifted in the one paradigm in comparison to the other so that language itself is
not shared between them. See KUHN, supra note 20, at 149 ("[Clompeting paradigms prac-
tice their trades in different worlds.").
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both. Equality can only be defined in one way. The Supreme
Court exemplified this view in a 1979 employment case:
The operative sections of Title VII prohibit racial discrimination in
employment simpliciter. Taken in its normal meaning, and as under-
stood by all Members of Congress who spoke to the issue during the
legislative debates, this language prohibits a covered employer from
considering race when making an employment decision .... 98
This definitional assumption expresses itself, as we see below, in a
relentless formalism99 in which historical context is utterly dis-
missed as a parameter of legal inquiry. For conservatives the fact
that few blacks have positions in management or academia, and the
fact that this is a chronic problem, has no legal meaning. It is, how-
ever, the decision to consider race, to pursue affirmative action in
order to eradicate historic inequities, for example, that constitutes
the discrimination. 100
Finally, there is a strand of this debate revolving around the na-
ture of language. For formalists, words within the discourse of
98. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)
(citation omitted).
99. Formalism can be defined by the way it looks at text: it sees text as a vehicle for an
author's intent. Moreover, there is the romantic notion that the writer's intent is "immortal"
to the ravages of time. Shakespeare's famous Sonnet LXV is the classic statement of the
idea:
Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
But sad mortality o'ersways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
Whose action is no stronger than a flower?
0! how shall summer's honey breath hold out
Against the wrackful siege of battr'ing days,
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?
0 fearful meditation! where, alack,
Shall Time's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid?
0! none, unless this miracle have might,
That in black ink my love may still shine bright.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SHAKESPEARE'S SONNErS 149 (Tucker Brooke ed., 1936). To this
imagery is added the fiction that we can, from our temporal distance, still determine this
intent and we must do so to preserve the integrity of the text. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAuLT, What
Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) (arguing that be-
cause the writer is absent, he does not really exist for interpretation - he is just a construct).
As it seeks to follow original "authorial" intent, interpretivism is a form of formalism. In law,
formalism is generally condemned. Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT oF LAW 124-30 (1961)
(criticizing formalism's refusal to acknowledge the necessity of choice in the penumbral area
of rules); Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism In Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1502, 1506-07 (1985) (describing formalism as the artificial narrowing of the range of
choices). But see Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Laiv,
97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (praising formalism for aspiring to see law as more than merely
political).
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 658 (1987) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (describing judicial approval of race-conscious remedies as an "engine of
discrimination").
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equality have fixed and objective meanings set by the legislature.
Thus the meaning of discrimination does not vary over time or from
one social context to another. Thus racial consideration cannot be
discriminatory when done against blacks and nondiscriminatory
when done against whites. This implies an objectivism' 01 about lan-
guage in which words may have one-to-one correlations with things
in the world.
Thus, the conservative paradigm of the social world, with its
rigid baselines concerning public and private spheres and its ab-
stract notions of what prejudice is, is brigaded by theories of inter-
pretation and language that are equally rigid. The three paradigms,
like wheels within wheels,1°2 operate between sign and signified,
between the word equality and its received legal meaning, to create
a grounding grand theory'0 3 or foundation for the discrimination
concept.
It is this debate about grand theory, about language and inter-
pretation, about epistemic sources, about self and other, that has
been at the core of the doctrinal debate about the meaning of
equality. At stake in the debate over the meaning of equality is the
extent to which Title VII will be a means of ameliorating the vast
gulf separating the socioeconomic conditions of black workers and
those of their white counterparts. Reciprocally, at the level of dis-
course, there is uncertainty about whether equality will have a ref-
erence to the lived experience of blacks, or if instead equality itself
101. Objectivism refers to, inter alia, the idea that there is a correspondence between the
word categories we use and the real world: "On this perspective, the world consists of some
fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete descrip-
tion of 'the way the world is.' Truth involves some kind of correspondence relation between
words or thought-signs and external things ... ." HiLARY PtrrNAM, REASON, TRurH AND
HIs-toRY 49 (1981). Many scholars believe that objectivisn is fundamentally flawed because
language provides no objective description of reality separate from our conceptual schemes.
Id at 50; see also Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1131 (1989).
102.
The appearance of the wheels and their work was like unto the colour of [a crystal]:
and the four had one likeness: and their appearance and their work was as it were a
wheel in the middle of a wheel.... Whithersoever the spirit was to go, they went, thither
was their spirit to go; and the wheels were lifted up over against them: for the spirit of
the living creature was in the wheels.
Ezekiel 1:16, 20 (King James).
103. There is a close interconnection, indeed a virtual identity, between the concept of
grand theory as it functions within the law of Title VII and the concept of ideology. The
function of grand theory in the context of Title VII is to legitimate racial hierarchy as it exists
in the workplace. Grand theory does this by creating a system of ideas that is received as
rigorously logical and in which unjust results are not choices but logical and inevitable out-
comes. See TUsHNEr, supra note 21, at 3 (arguing that the chief goal of grand theory is to
legitimate the existing system of constitutional law).
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may be defined in such a way that it never reaches that context and
becomes meaningless for blacks.
B. Competing Paradigms of Fault
Through a series of Supreme Court cases dealing nominally with
procedural issues, particularly the burden and order of proof in Ti-
tle VII cases, the Supreme Court has been engaged incrementally in
defining the meaning and content of discrimination and, concomi-
tantly, equality.1°4 Ostensibly, the cases unfold as answers to the
questions of what evidence must be shown at each stage of the liti-
gation, who must produce the evidence, who has the burden of per-
suasion, and to whom the evidence should be presented. Moreover,
these issues of what evidence is required and from whom pivot on a
balance between competing notions of fault qua fault. Fault forms
the pivot because equality in its opaqueness is not directly the sub-
ject of debate. Rather, courts seem to discuss equality only implic-
itly and through a circumlocutory discussion of fault that feeds in
circular fashion into the courts' background assumptions.
One notion of fault, which we will call the objective model,
premises liability on causation. This is the model traditional to la-
bor law.10 5 It is also the model that flows most literally, for those
literalists among us, from the text of the statute, which simply says
that a violation occurs when an employer makes a decision "be-
cause of ... race.'106 This notion of fault is essentially objective.
104. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). These cases will be dis-
cussed in detail infra Part III.
105. See Thomas G.S. Christensen & Andrea H. Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Com-
mission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J.
1269, 1269 (1968) ("Horizontal mergers may or may not violate anti-trust laws, but their
illegality is not dependent upon the motives of their promoters."). Also, it is important to
point out that in early labor law cases involving discrimination, intent was treated, "not as an
essential element of the substantive violation, but as an evidentiary aid in determining
whether protected union activity had been the cause of the terminations." Id. at 1275.
106. Title VII reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to ... discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race ...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ... because of such indi-
vidual's race ....
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency... to dis-
criminate... because of... race ....
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization -
(1) to ... discriminate... because of... race ....
(d) Training programs
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There is room here for a mental component of responsibility, but
this is referred to in context as motive and is determined through
the consideration of surrounding circumstances; it is an objective
quantity.107 Because of accessibility to proof, I would locate this
model at the pragmatic pole on the scale of moral responsibility.
There is also a notion of fault in discrimination law - the con-
tractarian model - that premises the liability of the employer on
intent. Justice Holmes provided the classic expression: Even a dog
knows the difference between being stumbled over and being
kicked.'08 This is often called, uncritically, the "fault" model. It
represents merely the contractarian pole in our thinking about
moral responsibility. This notion of fault is mentalistic and subjec-
tive. Here a psychological gloss is smuggled into the notion of cau-
sation, 10 9 and we must find actual intent associated with objective
causation before liability may be imposed. In this model we are
concerned with what the employer actually thought.
I suggest that each of these models corresponds to a particular
paradigm; each leads like a winding staircase to a particular grand
theory of discrimination. The objective model of fault leads to the
paradigm of equality in which results are supremely important.
People are equal according to their relative objective conditions.
The results of what the employer does, not his intent, are relevant.
Social context becomes the arbiter of meaning. There is room in
this pragmatic approach for the plight of blacks as a group to be a
core concern - for a sense of need to transform society, to eradi-
cate discrimination, and to ameliorate economic exclusion, not
merely police violations. This notion of equality in turn expresses
the perspective of the victim's experience. The contractarian model
of fault leads to the paradigm of equality that premises the individ-
ual as the proper unit of moral inquiry, that seeks to focus atomisti-
cally on specific violations, and that seeks everywhere to consider
the common law prerogatives of the employer.110 This notion of
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship ... to discriminate...
because of... race ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Note that intent is not expressly required.
107. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment
Analysis on Motive Rather than Inten4 60 S. CAL L. REV. 733 (1987) (arguing that motive
refers to the objective reasons a person does something and that such an objective mental
standard is frequently used in law).
108. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
109. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235,297
(1971).
110. Of course, the traditional prerogative of the employer was to be free from all con-
straints on who to hire and fire. Once the traditional prerogatives of the employer are con-
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equality is a pure expression of the traditional, stereotyped assump-
tions about what prejudice is. This notion of equality also lends
itself to a revised version of Joshua Hill's conception of social order
in which there is still a private sphere of life.
At each procedural juncture in the litigation of a Title VII case,
the Court is called upon to fashion standards of proof. What consti-
tutes a prima facie case? What satisfies the plaintiff's burden of
production? What constitutes rebuttal of a prima facie case? What
is the nature of the presumptions created at each point? I suggest
that the Court makes a choice at each of these points. On the sur-
face, the choice is between competing models of proof. With unerr-
ing consistency over the last thirty years of litigation, at each
juncture of the proof process, in cases involving both broad institu-
tional practices and individual claims, the Court has relentlessly fo-
cused all inquiry on the employer's intent. In effect, the Court has
constructed discrimination as a creature of the employer's mental
processes.
Implicitly, the Court has chosen a subjectivist conception of
fault with all the theoretical structure that conception contains. I
would argue that the systematic way in which the Court has chosen
a subjectivist conception is a function of an underlying grand the-
ory. At each doctrinal juncture the Court makes a choice that cor-
responds to a certain notion of a private sphere of life, background
assumptions about the nature of prejudice, and a concept of the
primacy of individual decisionmaking. At the same time, the Court
expresses a formalism in construing crucial terms and an objectiv-
ism about language. This objectivism - this conflating of chosen
interpretation of equality with objective meaning - allows the
Court to build its grand theory into the very process of interpreta-
tion. Equality is rigidly defined, across a substantive and a herme-
neutic axis. It has only one meaning and calls for only one narrow
interpretive approach. Equality itself becomes a barrier to dis-
course - a wall.
sidered, determining the scope of antidiscrimination laws becomes at each juncture a
balancing test. A court weighs the desirability of protecting minorities against the undesir-
ability of intruding on traditionally "forbidden ground." (My apologies to Professor
Epstein.) Caselaw makes this tension explicit. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (speaking of the "delicate balance between employee and em-
ployer rights struck by Title VII"); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In
referring to the balance between the rights of putative victims of discrimination and the tradi-
tional "freedom" of the employer, the Hopkins Court stated that "Title VII eliminates cer-
tain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers'
freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives turns
out to be decisive .... 490 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added).
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III. EQUALITY AS PRISON
The shades of the prison-house closed round about [me]: walls strait
and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable
to sons of night who must plod darkly on in resignation, or beat un-
availing palms against the stone, or steadily, half hopelessly, watch the
streak of blue above."'
Title VII, prior to the act of interpretation, was the legal
equivalent of a blank canvas." 2 Discrimination, the core evil to be
addressed, is a figure entirely unformed within the empty space
framed by the statute. What the statute says is that when an em-
ployer makes a decision "because of ... [inter alia] race," this is
"discrimination" per se.113 But there is no context to give this text
dimension. The precise nature of the term discrimination and how
we are to structure elements of proof remained for the future.
The form that discrimination traditionally took was that of "dis-
parate treatment." Disparate treatment is thus "the most easily un-
derstood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race .... 1114 For
my purposes it is helpful to understand disparate treatment as a
form of discrimination involving individual decisionmaking. The
classic instance of this form of discrimination is perhaps best repre-
sented by the fact pattern in Slack v. Havens,"5 in which blacks
were assigned to do janitorial work while a white with the same job
title, responsibilities, and supervisor was specifically exempted from
having to do the work. There is no inchoate notion of fault associ-
ated ab initio with the idea.
Early on, in the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power,116 a sec-
ond form of discrimination was identified. This form of discrimina-
tion goes under the heading of "adverse impact." This notion refers
to an institutional setting in which a policy or procedure or test dis-
proportionately excludes blacks. Griggs arose when a utility com-
pany required applicants to have both a high school diploma and
"satisfactory scores" on two aptitude tests in order to be hired for
111. Du Bois, supra note 23, at 16.
112. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 411 (arguing that statutes do not have preinterpretive
meanings).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
114. Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
115. 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1975).
116. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The classic article on Griggs is Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. Rav. 59 (1972).
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its "desirable" jobs.117 These facially neutral requirements oper-
ated to exclude blacks disproportionately. 1 8 The Court held that
adverse impact of the test and prerequisites to employment was
presumptively discriminatory. Unless the employer could show a
business necessity for maintaining the test and the prerequisites,
these requirements were illegal.1" 9 This model clearly emerged
from a sense of statutory purpose that sought to "remov[e] artificial
barriers" to blacks in the workplace. 20 The Supreme Court
seemed to say that the notion of fault operative here was an objec-
tive notion concerned not with the "good intent or absence of dis-
criminatory intent" of the employer's decisions' 21 but with the
"consequences" of his decisions. 22
Courts viewed these two concepts of discrimination - disparate
treatment and adverse impact - as distinct, proceeding initially
along parallel lines of inquiry in any given case and developing par-
allel lines of doctrinal authority. These early models of discrimina-
tion, defined by the factual scenarios in which they arose, represent
basic stereotypes of discrimination. They provide skeletal images,
mere stick figures for a picture of discrimination yet to be fully ar-
ticulated. As we move beyond the classic instances to more com-
plex psychological and institutional practices, it is necessary to
determine the precise contours of the discrimination concept. We
must draw the stick figures more precisely and trace the lines of
authority more carefully.
As the Supreme Court fleshed out its picture of the respective
models of discrimination, it unerringly fleshed out its picture of
equality. It increasingly confined discrimination to the parameters
of a model of fault that focused on intent. 23 The two parallel lines
117. 401 U.S. at 427-28. The plant was divided into five departments: labor, coal han-
dling, operations, maintenance, and laboratory and testing. Applicants for positions in all
departments except labor had to meet the test and diploma requirements. Incumbent em-
ployees could transfer from labor or coal handling to the other three departments by passing
the two tests, even if they did not have a high school diploma. 401 U.S. at 428.
118. While 34% of white males finished high school, only 12% of black applicants had
done so. Similarly, while 58% of whites passed the required tests, only 6% of blacks passed.
401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
119. 401 U.S. at 431.
120. What Congress requires "is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary bar-
riers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification." 401 U.S. at 431.
121. 401 U.S. at 432.
122. 401 U.S. at 432 ("But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
the employment practices, not simply the motivation.").
123. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)("The 'factual inquiry' in a Title VII case is '[whether] the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff.' " (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
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of authority corresponding to the two distinct theories of proof be-
gan to blur and merge into one. Embedded as a kind of pentimento
in that relentlessly intentionalist picture of discrimination as it de-
veloped 124 was a relentlessly formal-objectivist view of the world.
A. The Submergence of Disparate Treatment in Subjectivism
The seminal case is, of course, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.'25 Percy Green had been laid off from his job as laboratory
technician and mechanic at McDonnell Douglas, an aerospace man-
ufacturer. He protested his separation by participating, with other
members of the Congress on Racial Equality, in a "stall-in" at the
plant during the morning rush hour.126
Despite his bold protest, he reapplied at McDonnell Douglas for
positions later advertised that fit his job skills.' 27 To no one's sur-
prise, he was passed over for hire. 28 The issue before the Supreme
Court was the burden and order of proof. The Court held that a
Title VII case unfolds in three stages. At the first stage, the plaintiff
is required to eliminate the obvious reasons for his nonselection.129
248, 253, 255 (1981))); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978);
Welch, supra note 107, at 734 ("The need to establish discriminatory intent in order to uphold
a Title VII disparate treatment claim is one of the most settled positions in discrimination
theory.").
124.
Old paint on a canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that hap-
pens it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will show through a
woman's dress, a child will make way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea.
This is called pentimento because the painter "repented," changed his mind. Perhaps it
would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of
seeing and then seeing again.
*.. I wanted to see what was there.., once, what is there ... now.
LILLIAN HFLLMAN, PENTIMENTO 3 (1973).
125. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
126.
[F]ive-teams, each consisting of four cars would "tie-up" five main access roads into
McDonnell .... The drivers... were instructed to line up next to each other completely
blocking the intersections or roads. The drivers were also instructed to stop their cars,
turn off the engines, pull the emergency break .... The plan was to have the cars remain
in position for one hour.
Acting under the "stall in" plan, plaintiff ... drove his car onto Brown Road, a
McDonnell access road, at approximately 7:00 a.m., at the start of the morning rush
hour. Plaintiff was aware of the traffic problems that would result.
411 U.S. at 794-95 (quoting Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo.
1970), revd., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)) (alteration in
original).
127. 411 U.S. at 796.
128. 411 U.S. at 796.
129. The Court would later say that this prima facie formula was based on common expe-
rience with discrimination in which "we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
Michigan Law Review
If the plaintiff carries this burden, the employer may "articulate
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. ' 130 If the defendant
carries this burden, the inquiry moves to a more specific level, and
the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove pretext.13'
The initial skirmishes occurred around the debate over the bur-
den of the employer at the point of rebuttal. The point of conten-
tion was the definition of what constituted a permissible reason for
rejecting a minority applicant. McDonnell Douglas held that an
employer had to make out a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
But did legitimate mean "reasonably related to a proper employ-
ment objective," implying that the court had a role in scrutinizing
the reasonableness vel non of the employer's explanation? Or was
the term legitimate a reference to any reason that was nondiscrimi-
natory, implying that the court's role was simply to make sure no
illicit - as opposed to merely arbitrary - rationale was involved?
The question here is a question of the level of scrutiny to be
applied.
The case to resolve this was Furnco Construction Corp. v. Wa-
ters.132 Furnco, a company that produced firebrick, maintained no
permanent force of bricklayers. 33 The employer hired sporadically
and through a foreman named Dacies. 34 Dacies's selection proce-
dure was to recruit by word of mouth, limiting hires to people he
knew or who had been recommended to him. 35 He did not accept
applications at the gate.136 Undaunted by what was formally a
closed selection process, three black bricklayers, each of whom was
concededly qualified, trudged up to the gate day after day for em-
ployment.137 Vacancies existed, but despite their qualifications they
were not, and under Dacies's policy could not, be considered. 138
They watched, no doubt, as white workers no better qualified than
themselves were consistently chosen instead of them. They were
like batters struck out before they came to bat. TWo of them were
never hired, and the third found employment only a great deal of
time after he initially applied.139
130. 411 U.S. at 802.
131. 411 U.S. at 802.
132. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
133. 438 U.S. at 569.
134. 438 U.S. at 569-70.
135. 438 U.S. at 569-70.
136. 438 U.S. at 569-70.
137. 438 U.S. at 569-70.
138. 438 U.S. at 569.
139. 438 U.S. at 569-70.
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The sufficiency of prima facie proof was not in dispute. The fact
pattern perfectly matched the elements of the McDonnell Douglas
model: the men were qualified and had done all that could be done
to apply, they were rejected - not even considered - and the em-
ployer went on to hire white applicants of similar qualifications.
The need for an objective explanation of the issues raised by the
prima facie case shifted the burden140 to Furnco to articulate a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason. The employer's reason was osten-
sibly that the workers did not qualify under the employer's
particular procedure. The qualification lacking, however, was not
something related to the job or any failing on the part of plaintiffs;
it was knowing Dacies well enough to be recommended.
The court of appeals, applying a rule of reasonableness, rejected
this as legally insufficient.141 This could be justified in two ways.
First, the significance of a prima facie case under McDonnell Doug-
las is that one addresses the obvious reasons for rejections and in so
doing creates the presumption that the decision to reject was not
premised on objective considerations. 142 The significance of this in
turn is that employers, as maximizers of utility, would not be ex-
pected to act irrationally and that by showing irrationality in the
selection process, one sets up the presumption that an irrational
consideration, such as race, is involved. There is also operative
here a concept of fault; penalties should bear some rational rela-
tionship to individual conduct. If the individual black is not lacking
in any objective respect, if he did not do anything wrong or has not
failed to do something required, it is unfair to penalize him for irra-
tional reasons. It follows that reasons that lack objectivity or ra-
tionality fail to rebut the presumption of discrimination. If not for
considerations of race, why would a maximizer of utility not choose
these qualified blacks who applied, or tried to, day after day? Sec-
140. This burden is often referred to as the burden of going forward with the evidence. It
refers to the duty to place a question of fact in dispute reasonably in doubt, to give the jury a
genuine question of fact to decide. Although courts speak of the standard as though it repre-
sents a certain level of proof, it is most easily understood as a rule defining the role of the
judge and jury. The burden of production refers to the situation in which, if the party does
not place the issue "reasonably" in doubt, the judge may dismiss the case without jury consid-
eration. See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
Wigmore refers to this as the "risk of nonpersuasion." See 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2485, at 285 (James H. Chadbourne ed., rev. ed. 1981).
The risk refers to a duty imposed by the substantive law of a particular area to require a party
to persuade a jury, or the judge as trier of fact if there is no jury, that an issue of fact is true or
false. "The jury must be told that if the party having the burden to persuade has failed to
satisfy that burden, the issue is to be decided against him." MCCORMICK, supra, § 336, at 784.
141. 438 U.S. at 573-74.
142. 438 U.S. at 572-73.
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ond, from a pragmatic or result-oriented perspective, rejecting sub-
jective explanations as insufficient is the right definitional balance;
it simply carries forward the substantive policy of Title VII, requir-
ing a strong means-ends nexus between the reasons given for ex-
cluding minorities and legitimate business concerns.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "Title VII prohibits
[an employer] from having as a goal a work force selected by any
proscribed discriminatory practice, but it does not impose a duty to
adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority employ-
ees."143 Of course, one must be forgiven for asking, "Why not?"
The answer is complex. My interpretation is that the Court as-
sumed a priori that discrimination is a creature of the employer's
intent. There was no discrimination here because there was no in-
tent to exclude blacks: whites would have been treated the same
way. The inquiry of the Court ended with the determination that
there was no discriminatory intent and hence no discrimination.
The employer's reason, however subjective, sufficiently provided a
nondiscriminatory explanation - an explanation that, if believed,
negated a finding of discriminatory intent - albeit an explanation
that was not entirely fair to the blacks involved. The question be-
comes "Why is discrimination posited as an intentionalist
conception?"
There is nothing in the text of the statute to authorize this read-
ing. The idea of discrimination as intentional is simply an expres-
sion of the subjectivist assumptions about fault. The thread
knotting together a subjective fault model and discrimination is a
felt imperative to guard the employer's freedom of choice against
the social claims of minorities. The autonomy of the employer rests
on social contract, which necessarily and inevitably circumscribes
the ambit to Title VII and the discrimination concept. Autonomy
here may be read as "autonomous subjectivity." The subjectivity of
the employer is curtailed at one point - the employer may not
premise hiring decisions on racial considerations. Beyond that
point he stands, again, within Joshua Hill's sphere of liberty. The
imperative of protecting the employer's subjectivity is brigaded by a
notion of common law baselines - the common law prerogatives
of the employer to hire or fire for good reason, bad reason, or no
reason at all.
The struggle within Furnco and within the early cases is over the
nature of the discrimination inquiry. Prior to Furnco, disparate
143. 438 U.S. at 577-78.
2350 [Vol. 92:2311
No Time for Trumpets
treatment or discrimination by "individuals" could be evaluated
using notions of fault that are either objective or subjective. Furnco
marks the descent of Title VII standards and of the concept of dis-
crimination into subjective standards of fault. The problem is two-
edged, involving an increasing license to provide (i) unspecific or
vague reasons or (ii) personal reasons based on the employer's
taste. In both cases, we are talking about subjective explanations,
which escape objective judgment or close questioning. As the stan-
dards become increasingly subjective and detached from objective
inquiry in this way, Title VII inquiry becomes more and more like
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause: the in-
quiry becomes more and more circular and tautological. 144
We start with the premise of Furnco that any conceivable reason
except a discriminatory reason will do. Any differentiation be-
tween two candidates becomes sufficient. Of course, whenever an
employer decides between two different people, the fact of differ-
ence will inevitably lead to a rational distinction for purposes of the
rule. Thus, the logical tendency of the Furnco "permission" is to
presume employer neutrality from the sheer fact of individual
difference.
Moreover, if this laissez faire approach entails the notion that
one can be general or vague in every case, then in every case -
except that of overt discrimination - there will be a refuge for the
employer in generalities. Unless the law requires an objective qual-
ification of the differentiation - unless the law prescribes the spec-
ificity and the reasonableness of the explanation - then the
process of looking for a reason will usually produce one. Low-level
scrutiny - whether done explicitly, as it is under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, or implicitly through subjectivist approaches to fault
under Title VII - is generally a sham; it is a green light for employ-
ers to affix to a particular case the fig leaf of an artificial or general
explanation.
The circularity of the subjective approach, if not readily appar-
ent from Furnco itself, emerges in the context of gender from the
fact pattern of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine.145 Burdine involved a state agency, fully funded by the U.S.
144. Justice Brennan decried the tendency of rational basis review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause as tautology. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
178 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[B]y presuming purpose from result, the Court reduces
analysis to tautology."); see also Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection,
82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). Here the result of Furnco is to allow courts to presume legitimacy
from individual difference.
145. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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Department of Labor, that provided employment training.146 The
facts begin with a budding success story for a young woman who
was hired in January 1972 as an accounting clerk.1 47 She was pro-
moted to field services coordinator in July and was given expanded
responsibilities in November when her supervisor, the project direc-
tor, resigned. 48 In fact, according to the district court's findings,
those expanded duties included doing her former supervisor's job,
but without the former supervisor's pay. 149 Burdine officially ap-
plied for her supervisor's position, but the position remained open
for six months. 50
Around that time the Department of Labor threatened to termi-
nate the funding of the agency due to "serious concerns" about
inefficiency. As acting supervisor, Burdine played a role in saving
the agency's funding. The continuation of the funding was contin-
gent upon, among other things, hiring a new project director and
reorganizing the staff.'5 '
One would have thought Burdine's star was rising. She was,
many would have thought, the logical person for the supervisor's
job; but instead of promoting Burdine, the deciding official, Fuller,
fired her. 52 No good deed goes unpunished, it seems. Burdine's
co-worker in the department, however, a Mr. Allen Walz, was re-
tained and promoted to the position of project coordinator.153 In-
terestingly, there was no dispute that Burdine had trained Walz for
the job he held before she left. 54
Burdine charged discrimination, inter alia, with respect to her
discharge and the retention of Walz. 55 The agency's purported rea-
son for terminating Burdine was that "the three individuals termi-
nated did not work well together, and that TDCA thought that
146. 450 U.S. at 250.
147. 450 U.S. at 250.
148. 450 U.S. at 250.
149. See Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1979)
("[Joyce Burdine] proved that she ... was qualified to do the job that Allen Walz was re-
tained and promoted to do. In fact, she had been doing that job, and more, for six months
when terminated."), vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
150. 450 U.S. at 250.
151. 450 U.S. at 250.
152. The Supreme Court opinion glosses over much of the rich factual record in this case.
The record, however, is fleshed out in the opinion of the court of appeals. See 608 F.2d at
565.
153. 608 F.2d at 565.
154. 608 F.2d at 568 n.9.
155. 608 F.2d at 566.
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eliminating this problem would improve PSC's efficiency."'1 56
There was no evidence that Fuller made any evaluation of Walz's
ability to work well with others. 57 The reason he gave for retaining
Walz instead of Burdine was merely that Walz was qualified for the
job.
For me the problem with these reasons is that they are incoher-
ent as such. Fuller's proffered explanations do not in any rational
way explain the decision made. Fuller's "explanation" that Walz
was qualified merely begs the question of why he was retained in
the reorganization, but Burdine was not, if there was no conclusion
that Burdine was unqualified. The claim that Burdine did not work
well with others is similarly unilluminating in isolation. The ques-
tion would seem to be "How did Burdine compare with Walz?" As
the employer made no claims that he investigated this comparison,
there was no coherent reason for him to retain Walz and let
Burdine go. Again, an employer is a maximizer of utility.158 Fuller
would not fire an employee without a thought process or actual rea-
son. Without a reason, Fuller, as a rational actor and chooser,
would not jettison human capital. Yet, incredibly, none is provided.
There is only a disconcerting silence.
156. 450 U.S. at 251.
157. 608 F.2d at 568.
158. The notion of the average employer as maximizer of utility seems implicit in the
perspective of conservatives on the Court and explicit in the writing of some conservative
academics. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPS'mIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws (1992) (arguing that employment discrimination laws
are an unwarranted and unjustifiable constraint on the contractual freedom of both employ-
ers and employees). The idea seems to be that the average employer as a maximizer of utility
is motivated by business reasons. A corollary, at least in the Court's version of the idea's
explication, is that only the deviant employer with a taste for discrimination considers mat-
ters beyond ordinary business considerations. This perspective undergirds the Court's con-
struction of the prima facie case, requiring the plaintiff to eliminate the objective reasons for
nonhire.
The problem with the Court's deployment of the concept is the fallacy, certainly not em-
pirically grounded, that the employer motivated by discriminatory animus is deviant. Con-
sider the following facts:
Median income for blacks with some college education is lower than for white high
school dropouts. At every level of educational achievement, blacks earn far less than
whites. Black unemployment is at twenty-one percent, a figure not matched by whites
since the early 1930's. Since the early 1970's, black unemployment has been over double
the white rate. For every one hundred dollars earned by the typical white family, the
typical black family earns about fifty-six dollars.
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Address, Civil Rights: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, 14 COLUM.
HUM. R-s. L. REv. 1, 8 (1982). I suspect that at a deep level, as an institutional practice,
discrimination continues apace as something subtle but closer to "normal." One way in
which Epstein's model is both false and simplistic is that he uncritically adopts a false model
of economic choice and a false model of the employer as an autonomous economic chooser,
aloof from historical forces.
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The issue here is whether the employer can satisfy his burden
without providing an objective reason or "rational" explanation -
without telling us something specific enough that it gives us a han-
dle on the actual thought process involved. The threshold question
is the nature of the reason or the type of evidence that is required.
This should have been framed as a burden-of-production problem.
The court of appeals found the employer had not met a burden of
persuasion that Walz was more qualified than Burdine.159 The
court implicitly addressed the sheer irrationality of the employer's
response - that the employer failed to present a coherent explana-
tion. The court couched its specific concern about lack of an expla-
nation, however, in a general rule that required the employer to
persuade the fact finder that the male was "better qualified."
Seizing upon this broad-brush decisionmaking, the Supreme
Court framed the issue as whether, after the plaintiff has proven a
prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden that shifts
to the defendant is a burden of persuasion to prove a nondiscrimi-
natory reason, or whether it is a burden of production only. With
short shrift the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, re-
jected the notion that the employer has any duty to "persuade."'1 60
The Court discussed the reasons in terms of presumptions.' 6'
The notion is that the prima facie case merely eliminates the most
obvious reasons for discrimination. Thus, the employer need only
produce evidence that there was a nondiscriminatory "reason.' 62
This conceptualizes the discrimination inquiry as one about the sub-
jective or actual intent of the employer. This framework suppresses
an objective notion of fault that might have made the decision
hinge on identifying conditions associated with discrimination, such
as the qualified minority who is passed over and an attendant pre-
sumption of liability when objective reasons are lacking. The ab-
sence of rational explanations clearly does not matter.
A related premise here is that the employer's "traditional pre-
rogatives" survive Title VII - that, in effect, the statute's parame-
ters are framed by common law baselines. The employer's liberty
to be free in his domain of any constraints anchors a notion that in
the employer's domain he should be free of the government's in-
truding gaze. There should be no scrutiny, no questioning beyond
159. 608 F.2d at 567.
160. 450 U.S. at 256.
161. See, e.g., 450 U.S. at 254 ("Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.").
162. 450 U.S. at 253.
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that necessary to determine the existence vel non of subjective in-
tent to discriminate. The Court defends liberty of the employer but
at the expense of ensuring that the intermediate phase of review,
the point of the employer's rebuttal, will be tautology because it
lacks any objective constraints.
For the Court, the point was that the plaintiff would later have
an opportunity to prove pretext. Pretext refers to an artificial rea-
son that masks the real, discriminatory reason. The classic way of
showing pretext is to identify a comparative. In Slack v. Havens,163
it was the white who was let off cleaning detail while all the blacks
were so assigned. The linchpin of comparison has been the notion
of qualifications. Doctrinally, however, the concept of qualification
and consequently the concept of pretext itself has become absorbed
in the fog of a subjectivist approach. 164
In the wake of Burdine, one other avenue of proving pretext
remained. If the plaintiff could show that the reason provided was
not the true reason, she could establish pretext: "She may succeed
in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence."165
The fact pattern in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,166 how-
ever, closed the door on that approach. In 1980 a black man was
163. 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
164. In United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), a
black supervisor for the Postal Service had been passed over for promotion 12 times by
whites who, by "objective measures," were inferior to him. 460 U.S. at 713 n.2. Aikens had
been rated as an outstanding supervisor whose management abilities were far above
average. There was no derogatory ... information in his personnel folder. He had more
supervisory seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the
[whites] ... promoted above him. He ha[d] a master's degree and ha[d] completed three
years of residence towards a Ph.D.
460 U.S. at 713 n.2 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). Ten of the whites
promoted over Aikens had no education beyond high school. 460 U.S. at 713-14 n.2. The
district court ruled in favor of the Postal Service, but the court of appeals reversed, in essence
on the theory that the district court had erred in evaluating the comparative evidence of
pretext. 460 U.S. at 713. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the 'factual inquiry' in
a Title VII case is 'whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'"
460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). Superior objective qualifications, like
those of Aikens, mean nothing in themselves. There is no necessary nexus between discrimi-
nation and the practice of passing over a black Ph.D. in favor of a white high-school
graduate.
While the rationale is not explicit, the notion seems to be that the concept of pretext must
track a line that gives free rein to the employer's subjective tastes. Within the realm of tastes,
the employer is free to prefer law student to law professor, inexperience to experience.
Qualifications are constructed as subjective. Comparative evidence becomes endlessly
equivocal.
165. 450 U.S. at 256.
166. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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promoted to supervisor.167 Following a supervisory shakeup in
1984, his employer retained him but gave him a new immediate and
intermediate supervisor.168 A pattern of disciplinary action fol-
lowed, in which his employer suspended, reprimanded, demoted,
and finally fired him for the failures of his subordinates when it was
clear that no other supervisors had been penalized for such
lapses. 169 There was no dispute that the policies he allegedly vio-
lated did not actually exist and that the disciplinary proceedings
against him had been a sham. The district court concluded that
"although [he] has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate
him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than
personally motivated.' 170
There was no dispute that the employer had lied and that the
reasons given for Hicks's dismissal were not the real reasons. The
plaintiff claimed that this sufficed for a showing of pretext. His ar-
gument followed the precise language of Burdine: that a plaintiff
could establish pretext by showing that the reasons given were "un-
worthy of credence.' 17' The Court rejected this approach.
The Court held, first, that the plaintiff has the burden of persua-
sion throughout the trial. 72 This holding, however, merely raises
the question of what may satisfy that burden. According to the text
of Burdine, showing that the employer's reason is not credible is not
enough to satisfy the burden of persuasion. For the Court, the fact
that the defendant is a liar does not mean that he is a bigot or a
discriminator: "But a reason cannot be 'a pretext for discrimina-
tion' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that dis-
crimination was the real reason."'1 73 But this assumes that
discrimination is a priori an intentional act and that objective no-
tions of fault with attendant notions of constructive intent do not
apply.
Much of the Court's analysis is verbal slight of hand. The start-
ing point and foundation of the Court's rationale, in the teeth of its
167. 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
168. 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
169. 113 S. Ct. at 2746, 2748.
170. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Various
considerations led the court to this conclusion, including the facts that two blacks sat on the
disciplinary review board that recommended disciplining the respondent, that the respon-
dent's black subordinates who actually committed the violations were not disciplined, and
that the number of black employees at St. Mary's remained constant. 756 F. Supp. at 1252.
171. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
172. 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
173. 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253) (emphasis omitted).
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own pronouncements in Burdine, is a rhetorical theory of discrimi-
nation. That is, for the Court, discrimination plainly entails an in-
tentional act. This theory of discrimination is rhetorical in the sense
that, as noted above, there is no textual warrant for this, much less
an objective means of fixing discrimination as an intentional con-
struct. The structure of the Court's analysis is not to demonstrate
that discrimination must always be intentional but to posit it and
repeat, like one repeats a mantra, the dicta of Burdine that the issue
in the case is intentional discrimination. 174 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Hicks also exploits the procedural posture of the case.
The plaintiff brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title
VII. The section 1983 claim was founded on' an equal protection
theory that requires a showing of racial purpose. The plaintiff
thus pleaded that he was intentionally discriminated against. This
allowed the Court to emphasize that this was a claim about inten-
tional discrimination. The Court then went on to conflate the evi-
dentiary standards of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause:
"[T]he purposeful-discrimination element of respondent's § 1983
claim... is the same as the purposeful-discrimination element of
his Title VII claim . . . . Neither side challenges that
proposition."'175
But from the standpoint of the interpretive methodology so sys-
tematically used by Justice Scalia - a method that relies upon the
"plain meaning" of words - the source or grounding of the idea
that discrimination equals intentional discrimination is not the ac-
quiescence of the plaintiff but Scalia's and the Court's own free-
.wheeling objectivism. Words are posited as essences, as mind-
independent quantities. In this fixed, unchanging interpretive uni-
verse, discrimination has been indefeasibly joined with intent.
The objectivism, however, does not stop with positing discrimi-
nation as intentional. The focus on intent can entail a number of
widely varying standards for proving intent. Intent is variously un-
derstood as (i) subjective foreseeability, as in intentional torts; (ii)
objective foreseeability, as with negligence in tort; and (iii) account-
ability for the consequences of one's behavior, as with strict liabil-
174. "We granted certiorari to determine whether, in a suit against an employer alleging
intentional racial discrimination .... " 113 S. Ct. at 2746. The Court relied heavily on
Burdine, repeating its pronouncement that the ultimate issue in a discrimination case is the
"elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." 113 S. Ct. at 2746 (quoting Burdine,
450 U.S. at 255 n.3).
175. 113 S. Ct. at 2746-47 n.1.
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ity.17 6 The Court simply posits that actual intent, not its constructive
counterpart, is required. The subjectivism of the Court's theory of
fault and the objectivism of the Court's theory of language run into
and propel each other.
In Hicks the Court closes the circle that defines a sphere of au-
tonomy and sovereignty for the employer to decide whom to hire,
fire, or promote. The boundaries of the circle define not only a
space in which the employer may be subjective but an area in which
only evidence of subjective mental states counts. Finally, only com-
parative evidence will suffice to prove what that subjective state is.
If the employer claims that the black was fired for lateness, and the
court discovers that the black was never late, this does not necessar-
ily prove anything. 177 It only shows that the employer made a mis-
take or is a liar.
But even if one goes on to find a comparative - a white who
was late as much but was not fired - this comparative evidence,
through the window of the holding in Hicks, is quintessentially
equivocal: Was the white retained because of his race or because
the employer worked with or liked him better? The effect of in-
terfacing subjective standards of fault with a relentlessly particular-
ized focus upon individual relations between employer and
employee is of two mirrors being interfaced: the plaintiff in a Title
VII case finds herself in an infinite regress down an endless corridor
of skepticism about objective evidence.
It is possible to prove pretext, but, admissions aside, in the con-
text of a disparate treatment case, there is no objective way of do-
ing so.
176. See Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REv.
1407, 1423 (1990).
177. To be sure, the Scalia opinion permits a court to find discrimination if it finds that
the employer's explanation is not worthy of credence.
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons[ ] will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination.
113 S. Ct. 2749. My point, however, is that such a finding is not required. The plaintiff may
prove that the reasons given by the employer - for example, inadequate performance or
misconduct - were absolute lies, or even, as in Hicks, that the reasons given were concocted
as part of an active conspiracy to get rid of the plaintiff; even this proof will not necessarily
have any legal or evidentiary significance. In the beginning, the absence of objective reasons
for the employer's actions was pivotally significant for establishing a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. Now the absence of objective reasons ceases to be significant in itself
for purposes of pretext. The objective facts become irrelevant in themselves, and the subjec-
tive fact of what the employer thought in his mind becomes all-important.
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Formally, Title VII remains a clarion call to equal rights in the
market place. But in the cold reality of day-to-day enforcement, it
is hard to see how this call will ever get over the wall the Supreme
Court has built - a wall of assumptions about what discrimination
is, about what moral responsibility is - to reach the real world of
lived experience. 178 The exchange from Henry the Fourth, Part I
comes to mind:
Glendower:
I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur:
Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for them?179
B. No Exit: The Collapse of the Effects Model into Atomism
In the early years there were two theories of discrimination.
There was a theory of discrimination as an institutional phenome-
non and a theory of discrimination involving individual decision-
making. There was the effects model and the disparate treatment
model. These two theories not only reflected the different contexts
in which discrimination occurred but also represented an open-
ended language in which one could talk about competing notions of
equality. One notion was liberal, individualistic, subjectivistic, for-
mal; another notion was pragmatic and focused on the group, on
historical context, on broad social patterns.
The opposition between these two competing models of equality
has expressed itself as a debate around the issue of the proper
boundaries or limits of antidiscrimination law. In the original map-
ping, the effects model was taken as valid and reconcilable with the
disparate treatment model when each is relegated to its respective
context. This structure of discussion operated as a bridge between
different political and discursive communities, between employer
and victim of discrimination, between different world views. But
178. Consider, for example, that in fiscal year 1990 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission resolved 67,415 cases. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, EEOC, FY 1993
ANNUAL REPORT 32. Of these 67,415 cases, 41,510 (61.6%) were determined on the merits
- meaning that they were resolved after full investigation with findings that discrimination
did or did not occur. Id. at 10, 32. Of these 41,510 cases, the Commission determined that
discrimination likely occurred in only 2,973, or 4.4% of the total number of cases resolved.
Id. at 32. Further, the overwhelming majority of Title VII claimants lose in court. See
Theodore Eisenburg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner
Cases, 77 GEo. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (listing a success rate of 22%); id. at 1578 ("The success
rate[] for.., employment discrimination... [is] far below reported trial success rates for
most other litigation.").
179. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY THE FOURTH, PART I act 3, sc. 1, 11. 51-53 (David
Bevington ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1987) (1598).
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that framework depended on a dualism vis-A-vis models of discrimi-
nation and their respective underlying concepts of equality.
Through the sorcery of the Court's rhetorical approach, that du-
alistic framework has disappeared. After thirty years of discrimina-
tion law, we find ourselves in a system of fixed meanings, of
rhetorical assumptions received as fact. Discrimination is posited to
mean one thing: intentional discrimination by discrete, individual
actors. We know two things from this definition. We know what
the nature of discrimination is: it is intentional. From this defini-
tion of discrimination as intentional - as something only a discrete
individual can do - we also know implicitly what the limits or
boundaries of antidiscrimination laws are: antidiscrimination laws
constrain only individual decisions and require that in each instance
we locate and identify the discrete individual actor. The signifi-
cance of this definition is that the effects model, as it was originally
understood, disappears. The effects model as a model that ad-
dressed institutional exclusion - a model of results, of historical
context, of concerns external to the individual employer and her
individual decisions - a model, finally, of real equality - is ren-
dered incoherent. The two models collapse into one intentionalist
conception. The dominant, white political community has written
into law its fixed, individualistic, subjectivist view of equality as the
exclusive view.
The case of Wards Cove v. Atonio'80 illustrates the problem. It
was the culmination of a fifteen-year court battle by Aleuts and Fili-
pinos against the de facto racial stratification in a cannery plant.181
Although nonwhites composed ten percent of the pool of workers
who fit the classification of unskilled labor in the relevant labor
market area, over the years of the cannery's operation, they com-
posed from forty-seven to seventy percent of the cannery's un-
skilled laborers. 1' 2 On the other hand, "virtually all the employees
in the major categories of at-issue jobs [- office or administrative
jobs -] were white."'1 83
180. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
181. 490 U.S. at 663 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Again, only an examination of the record of the lower court decision permits an
appreciation of the stark facts of the case. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,437, at 33,828-29 (W.D. Wash. 1983), revd. in part, 827 F.2d 439 (9th
Cir. 1987), revd., 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Supreme Court did not question the primary facts
- only the legal inferences the lower courts made from them.
183. 490 U.S. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The cannery jobs in which nonwhites were concentrated were
not only the least prestigious but also the lowest paid.' 84 The can-
nery also provided separate dining facilities for whites and non-
whites. In addition, housing facilities were openly segregated by
the employer: the employer used the term Philippine Bunkhouse to
refer to cannery housing and native to refer to cannery jobs. 85 At
least one plant official took a matter-of-fact attitude toward the ra-
cial patterns in place at the plant:
"We are not in a position to take many young fellows to our Bris-
tol Bay canneries as they do not have the background for our type of
employees. Our cannery labor is either Eskimo or Filipino and we do
not have the facilities to mix others with these groups."' 86
The exclusion of nonwhites from the higher echelons of the work
force was so extreme that one Justice analogized it to plantation
life: "Some characteristics of the Alaska salmon industry described
in this litigation - in particular, the segregation of housing and
dining facilities and the stratification of jobs along racial and ethnic
lines - bear an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation
economy."' 87
Although no express policies prevented minorities from seeking
noncannery jobs, a system of interlocking discretionary employer
practices locked the racial stratification into place. First, the em-
ployer only accepted applications off-season, 88 rendering it impos-
sible for employees to apply during the period in which they were
employed and housed at the plant. Second, like the employer's pol-
icy in Furnco, the policy of the cannery was to refuse applications at
the gate. The vast majority of the minority cannery workers had
been recruited locally and were from Alaska.18 9 The employer
hired for noncannery jobs, however, mainly in Seattle, Washington
or Astoria, Oregon. 90
Further, there were no posted job vacancies. Recruitment for
noncannery jobs was by word of mouth from incumbent, predomi-
nantly white noncannery workers to their friends and relatives, who
almost always were also white.' 91 This led to an apparently incestu-
184. 490 U.S. at 647.
185. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,835.
186. 434 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,836 (quoting Letter from Hardy Parrish, Fore-
man, Wards Cove Packing Co. (Jan. 25, 1971)).
187. 490 U.S. at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,827.
189. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,828-29.
190. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,827.
191. 490 U.S. at 677 n.27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ous system of promotion in which family membership or friendship
ties became de facto qualifications. Under this regime, the lily-
white administrative workforce tended to perpetuate itself.
In addition to the absence of posted jobs, there were no posted
job qualifications.'9 2 Thus, nonwhites were in the dark not only as
to what jobs were vacant but also as to the requirements for those
jobs. During the litigation, the employer labeled all the jobs that
were traditionally filled by whites as "skilled" jobs. This was a sub-
jective label. The jobs often required skills, but they were skills that
could be provided in brief training.193 The employer provided no
training to cannery employees. 194
The adverse impact theory conceived of discrimination in terms
of requirements that were objective on their face but that operated
as artificial barriers to advancement, the classic instance being a
specific paper-and-pencil test or a policy requiring a high school di-
ploma. Once one identified the offending requirement or test, one
proceeded to ask whether the test was necessary to the business.
Generally one conducted a validity study to determine the effec-
tiveness of the test or credential as a predictor of job success. This
conception made three assumptions:
(i) Institutional policies that create artificial barriers will be
identifiable;
(ii) Institutional policies must rest on objective considerations -
that is, there must be a rational relationship between the credential or
test required and job performance; and
(iii) The value or importance of employment requisites imposed
via these policies will be objectively measurable, generally through a
scientific study of the predictive value of the credential or test
required.
The difficulty for the nonwhites in Ward's Cove was that their
claim of discrimination did not fit the contours of the assumptions
at the bottom of the adverse impact model. Their evidence of dis-
crimination was, first of all, the disparity between the relatively
small percentage of nonwhites in the unskilled laborer population
and the relatively large percentage of nonwhite unskilled workers
in the employer's work force. Further, they attempted to contrast
the percentage of nonwhites in cannery jobs and the percentage of
whites in noncannery jobs.195 For the Court, these comparisons
were irrelevant in and of themselves. The Court required the mi-
192. 490 U.S. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See 490 U.S. at 677 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,830.
195. 490 U.S. at 650-51.
2362 [Vol. 92:2311
No Time for Trumpets
norities to show a causal nexus between their exclusion and an
identifiable decision or policy on the part of the employer: "Espe-
cially in cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with
the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in
our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific em-
ployment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities."'1 96
From the Court's vantage point, having posited that discrimina-
tion is something a discrete, individual actor decides to do, to
require that one establish such a nexus was no more than to specify
the elements of a coherent claim. However, as I point out
elsewhere,
[d]iscrimination is not a discrete event. It is a reservoir or lake in
which a myriad of social institutions from slavery to Jim Crow, from
literature to science, from religious practices to housing patterns...
have all deposited their streams. It is a reservoir not merely of indi-
vidual hatreds and fears, but also of institutional inertia and cultural
bias built upon a myriad of myths and stereotypes.197
The exclusion of minorities in Wards Cove was associated not
with a discrete decision but with a web of policies and practices:
unposted job vacancies, off-season recruitment, recruitment from a
remote place. These practices of exclusion were no doubt aided
and abetted by deep-seated assumptions about the proper role of
"native boys" and the systematic disparities in job skills between
minorities historically locked into lower-paying jobs and whites who
were not.
Nonetheless, alas, because the minorities could not identify the
specific decision that had harmed- them, they could not make a
claim that was coherent to the Court. From the Court's atomistic
perspective, without evidence of a causal nexus between the identi-
fiable employer decision and injury, no discrimination could con-
ceivably be established.
This is, of course, circular. Everything flows from the rhetorical
assumption that the axis of inquiry is the decisions that the em-
ployer makes or fails to make. Discrimination only exists if a par-
ticular employer decides qua decides to treat similarly situated
people differently because of their race. It follows within this line
of reasoning that when a culpable decisionmaker is not identified,
there is no discrimination.
196. 490 U.S. at 656 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)).
197. Jones, supra note 78, at 367 (citations omitted).
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If one starts at the other pole of meaning - that segregation
and subordination of minorities are objective conditions that define
inequality - Wards Cove becomes a paradigm not of an incoherent
claim but of the incoherence of the Court's own models of proof.198
The fact that minorities were disproportionately concentrated in
unskilled jobs and were living in segregated conditions takes on
meaning as part of a larger historical pattern of exclusion and strati-
fication. The Court is able to deny the meaning of the pattern of
exclusion in Wards Cove by denying social and historical context as
relevant dimensions of a discrimination case. More precisely, the
Court adopts an epistemology in which law and moral certainty can
be grounded only in the facts of a particular case, not in history or
social understandings. Like the judges of the slavocratic regime,
the Court seems to say that we know nothing about a particular
case from knowing history or from our societal understandings.
It is the felt absurdity of this denial that Justice Blackmun ex-
pressed when he stated in his dissent, "One wonders whether the
majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more accu-
rately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a problem in our
society, or even remembers that it ever was."1 99 For me, the critical
point of this atomistic model is that the theoretical prism of the
conservatives does not merely produce a morally obtuse concept of
discrimination; it renders discrimination utterly invisible to them.
Absent an identifiable decision, racial stratification, no matter how
long-standing or extreme, does not "appear" to be a redressable
wrong. Lyotard's words come to mind here:
It is the nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been
done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone who has incurred damages and
who disposes of the means to prove it. One becomes a victim if one
198. Congress responded to Wards Cove with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
Incredibly, the statute does not address the problem I have with the case. I see no practical
way that minorities can challenge either employer hiring prerequisites that are substantially
subjective, such as word-of-mouth recruitment, or multiple interlocking prerequisites, such as
possessing the right job skills and applying off-season. The problem that the minority faces is
in identifying the specific prerequisite that causes the exclusion. The new Civil Rights Act
does not speak to this at all, presumably because the coalition that got the bill passed could
not come to a consensus that this kind of institutional problem was properly within the ken of
the law. For the proponents of the new legislation, there was ambivalence, I suspect, over the
boundaries between the problem I am identifying and the problem of society in general. In
short, I believe that the "reformers" bought into the Court's premise that discrimination is
about decisions. What the bill does is restore the business necessity standard, provide for
expanded monetary relief, and provide a jury trial. But all this will only generally address
discrimination in the classic forms described. From my perspective the statute reminds me of
the familiar police inspector who only rounds up the "usual suspects" in its ability to arrest
only meager forms of discrimination.
199. 490 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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loses these means. One loses them, for example, if the author of the
damages turns out directly or indirectly to be one's judge.... Recip-
rocally, the "perfect crime" does not consist in killing the victim or
the witnesses (that adds new crimes to the first one and aggravates the
difficulty of effacing everything), but rather in obtaining the silence of
the witnesses, the deafness of the judges, and the inconsistency (in-
sanity) of the testimony. You neutralize the addressor, the addressee,
and the sense of the testimony; then everything is as if there were no
referent (no damages). 2°°
IV. EQUALITY AS REDEMPTION
Reflecting the foundational semantic position of the Bible ... [t]he
invocation of utopia references what... I propose to call the politics
of transfiguration. This emphasises the emergence of qualitatively
new desires, social relations, and modes of association within the ra-
cial community of interpretation and resistance and between that
group and its erstwhile oppressors.20 1
Thirty years after Title VII, after the heady promises of the sec-
ond Reconstruction, black unemployment is more than two-and-
one-half times that of whites.202 Blacks who began their sojourn in
this country as slaves, and who were each historically counted for
purposes of apportionment as three-fifths of a man, earn today less
than two-thirds of what their white counterparts earn. 203 The dis-
parity in income increases as the level of education of blacks in-
creases. 204 Blacks still make up only three percent of the lawyers
and three percent of the doctors,20 5 but almost fifty percent of the
population of U.S. prisons and jails.206 Blacks are three times more
likely to be poor.207 Ironically, the Negro who was "walled out of
the larger economy" in the era of segregation continues as a black
person to be walled out of the economy after three decades of for-
mal "equal opportunity in employment" as "law."
200. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DIsPUTE 8 (George Van
Den Abbeele trans., 1988).
201. GILROY, supra note 38, at 37.
202. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UN-
EQUAL 103 (1992).
203. David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: "Permanent" Pov-
erty and Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1991, at 25, 28 tbl. 1 (Janet Dewart
ed., 1991).
204. HACKER, supra note 202, at 95 tbl.
205. Id. at 111.
206. Id. at 180.
207. See David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2152, 2160 (1989) (noting that although the percentage of black families below the
poverty line is 32.4%, the poverty rate for whites is 9.7%) (citing Allan C. Hutchison, Indiana
Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662-64 (1987) (book review)).
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The problem is not that equal employment law under Title VII
has merely failed to unbuild the wall of racism. Rather, it is that the
framework of law and interpretation built up in this area over the
last thirty years is part of the very structure of racism. It is not
enough to say that the great promise of equality has been broken to
the hearts of blacks. Equality as a liberal discourse, throughout this
era of reform and particularly within the precincts of Title VII law,
has been for blacks an instrument of disempowerment. According
to Derrick Bell's friend Geneva Crenshaw,
It is incredible that our people's faith could have brought them so
much they sought in law and left them with so little they need in life.
It is so unfair. Like the crusaders of old, we sought our Holy Grail
of "equal opportunity," and having gained it in court decisions and
civil rights statutes, found the quest to be for naught. Equal employ-
ment opportunity, far from being the means of achieving racial equal-
ity, has become yet another device for perpetuating the racial status
quo.208
The liberal notions of autonomous individual subjectivity, of a
private sphere of life, and of formalism in interpretation converge
as an ideological barricade between the victims of discrimination
and their history and context. The problem at one level is an in-
commensurability of world views and a legal framework in which
the experiences minorities wish to articulate are inexpressible
within the definitions and meanings of operative legal terms. Si-
multaneously, and with a universalist voice, the same legal system,
uncritical of its own objectivism, pronounces itself perspectiveless
and neutral. At another level it is a problem of conflicting eco-
nomic interests between victims who wish a redistribution of rights
and goods and a dominant group that feels such claims threaten the
foundation of legal order.
Finally, it is not merely theoretical investments or economic in-
terests that must be sacrificed on the altar of social justice but privi-
leged identities as well. Whiteness has referred not merely to racial
hierarchy but to a kind of psychic wealth.209 The masses of blacks
remain in a castelike status vis-A-vis the larger society.21o Race re-
mains "an important marker for social, legal, and economic sta-
208. Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights Chroni.
cles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (1985). Geneva Crenshaw is one of the characters Bell creates
in his narrative.
209. This in large part was my point in Jones, supra note 89, at 469.
210. See HACKER, supra note 202, at 103, 111 (illustrating disparities in unemployment
rates between blacks and whites, and also identifying categories of job fields in which blacks
are overrepresented and underrepresented).
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tus. ' 211 To embrace equality for some whites - real, not formal,
equality - would represent a loss of privilege, or property, pro-
foundly more important than that lost by slave owners in the
postbellum South.
Moreover, civil rights laws, regardless of their teeth - and Title
VII started with few - are inevitably filtered through an interpre-
tive lens. One's identity, one's psychological stakes in one's sense
of self, is itself a powerful lens naturalizing the results of a juridical
framework that legitimates the status quo.
"[lnterpretation is a function of identity." In interpreting the inter-
preter tends to recreate himself. Thus, interpretation acts as a kind of
mirror reflecting not so much the real world, but simply who the in-
terpreter is and his or her desires and fears.212
We seem to be caught in a circular argument, but it is not the argu-
ment which is circular - it is the human condition in which we can-
not extricate an "objective" reality from our "subjective" perception
of it.21
3
Race is always and already there. It is not possible to "not see it,"
only to be unaware of race as a window through which we look at
the world. The problem of racial identity itself and the problem of
interpretation within the discourse of Title VII are intertwined. To
transform the situation would mean not only jettisoning basic
precepts of liberal thought, not only yielding economic status, but
also yielding traditional concepts of racial identification. Each
white judge would have to find and become that black person inside
of himself for the law to work.214
Given the pervasiveness, depth, and systematicity of the prob-
lem, it is easy to understand why one law professor has lamented, in
the words of Jeremiah, "The harvest is past, the summer is ended
and we are not saved. 21 5
Paradoxically, I think this is a juncture of absolute despair and
absolute hope. It is, of course, impossible to imagine whites volun-
tarily making the sacrifices necessary to free blacks from the social
211. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, The Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act:
The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 967 n.6 (1993).
212. Jones, supra note 78, at 391-92 (quoting STEVEN MAILLOUX, INTERPRETIVE CON-
VENTIONS: THE READER IN THE STUDY OF AMERICAN FICTION 24 (1982)).
213. Norman N. Holland, Transactive Criticism: Re-Creation Through Identity, 18 CRITI-
CISM 334, 340 (1976).
214. This point seems to have application over a number of contexts. To do justice to
gender issues, judges who have always been privileged males would have to find a woman
inside of themselves. We could also apply this to issues of national origin. In terms of this
"finding," I refer not merely to empathy but to the deconstruction of privileged identity.
215. BELL, supra note 18, at vii (quoting Jeremiah 8:20).
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and economic prison house where they have been confined. But it
is also impossible to imagine that whites do not need to break down
the selfsame walls of the prison house that has blocked their moral
vision.
[W]hat the house of bondage accomplished for.., the classic white
American was the destruction of his moral sense, except in relation to
whites.... [T]herefore, his sense of white people had to be as compul-
sively one-dimensional as his vision of blacks. The result is that white
Americans have been one another's jailer's for generations .... 216
The regime of racial subordination and the grand theory of equality
that rationalizes it depends vitally on classical conceptions of self
and other; on the separation between that which is true and that
which is practically good and between that which is right and that
which one does; on a classical language and world view that is inter-
nally unstable.
If it is true that the discursive barrier we face is entrenched at a
profound depth, it is also true that it totters under the weight of its
own assumptions. We have to find a way to become an opposi-
tional force against this already-tottering edifice of ideology.
It is only when the slave names or defines his own reality that
she begins to have power, that she begins to live. Sisyphus, a kind
of slave, was condemned by power to roll a rock up a hill only to
have it roll back down when he reached the top. Then he was
doomed to repeat the process. As Camus has told us, Sisyphus be-
gan to live when, unable to alter his material conditions, he learned
to define his attitude toward them.217 Then he was free.
We have to find a way to redefine some terms - the basic terms
within the discourse of equality. This involves new relationships
with language and philosophy - perhaps a new canon in which
Ellison and Delany, Du Bois and Malcolm, Douglass and Franklin
take center stage. We must create in the interior, sovereign space
of writing itself an authentic connection between the experience of
ancestors enslaved and herded to the back of the bus and turned
away from lunch counters and knocked down by southern water-
hoses, and the contemporary experiences of blacks languishing un-
employed and marginalized in the ghettos of Harlem, South Central
Los Angeles, Overtown, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and East Baltimore.
We will find in that sacred, interior space a way to cross the suspen-
216. JAMES BALDWIN, Notes on the House of Bondage, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET 667,
672-73 (1985).
217. ALBERT CAMUS, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 119, 123 (Justin O'Brien trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1942).
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sion bridge between the spirit of Jeffersonian ideals and the reality
so eloquently captured in the vision of Dr. King. We will find a way
to say that there can be no wall between the true and the good, self
and other, private and public, black and white. Then, perhaps, a
new and finally modem America will be born - inside of us. Then,
perhaps, the ideal of equality which for so long has been meaning-
less will have a meaning. Then, perhaps, it will mean redemption.
